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FINE-GRAINED TYPE-FREE INTENSIONALITY 
Commonplace syntactic constructions in natural language seem to 
generate ontological commitments to a dazzling array of metaphysical 
categories - aggregations, sets, ordered n-tuples, possible worlds, 
intensional entities, ideal objects, species, intensive and extensive quan-
tities, stuffs, situations, states, courses of events, nonexistent objects, 
intentional and discourse objects, general objects, plural objects, vari-
able objects, arbitrary objects, vague kinds and concepts, fuzzy sets, 
and so forth. But just because a syntactic construction in some natural 
language appears to invoke a new category of entity, are we theoreti-
cians epistemically justified in holding that there are such entities? This 
would hardly seem sufficient. To be epistemically justified, the ontology 
to which we theoreticians are committed must pass strict standards: the 
entities must be of the sort required by our best comprehensive theory 
of the world. The thesis of this paper is that fine-grained type-free 
intensional entities are like this. If the thesis is right, these entities have 
a special objective status perhaps not possessed by some of the other 
ontological categories associated with special syntactic constructions in 
natural language. In fact, it is plausible to hold that fine-grained type-
free intensional entities provide the proper minimal framework for 
constructing logical and linguistic theories. In this paper my strategy 
will be to survey the competing conceptions of fine-grained type-free 
intensionality and to present arguments in support of one of them. 
Following this narrowing down process, I will go on to the indicated 
epistemological considerations. 
1. FROM INTENSIONAL LANGUAGE TO INTENSIONAL ENTITIES 
We begin by isolating two central uses of the term 'intensional', one 
logico-linguistic and one ontological. First, the logico-linguistic use. A 
language is extensional if, within it, equivalent formulas can be sub-
stituted for one another salva veritate: 
(A ... B) ___, ( ... A . .. ) ... ( ... B ... ). 
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A language is intensional if this substitutivity principle does not hold 
for it. 
Second, the ontological use. An item x is an extensional entity if it 
satisfies all relevant principles of extensionality. Principles of exten-
sionality come in two forms. First, let 'R' be any copula ('is', 'is an 
instance of', 'is related by', 'is a member of', 'is a part of', 'has', 'falls 
under', etc.) and let the item x be in the same ontological category as 
some item in the range of R. Then for all y in the same ontological 
category as x : 
('Vz)(zRx - zRy) ..... x = y. 
Second, let ' T' be any verifier ('is true', 'is so', 'obtains', 'holds', 
'happens', 'occurs', etc.) and let the item x be in the same category as 
some item that is an instance of T. Then for all y in the same category 
as x: 
(Tx - Ty) ..... x = y. 
With this definition of extensional entity we may define intensional 
entity: an item x is intensional if it is not extensional. That is, an item x 
is intensional if it fails to satisfy one or more of these extensionality 
principles. 
Paradigmatic intensional entities are properties, relations, and pro-
positions (PRPs). For example, suppose that x is the property of being 
a round square. There is an item (e.g., any non-null property) that is in 
the same ontological category as x and that is in the range of the 
relation expressed by the copula 'has'; and there is an item (e.g., the 
property of being the thirteenth Apostle) _that is in the same ontological 
category as x and that is had by all and only those items had by x and 
that is nevertheless not identical to x. Therefore, x fails to satisfy a 
principle of extensionality and, hence, is an intensional entity. For 
another example, suppose that x is the proposition that 5 + 7 = 13. 
There is an item (e.g., any true proposition) that is in the same onto-
logical category as x and that is an instance of the property expressed 
by the verifier 'is true'; and there is an item (e.g., the proposition that 
grass is red) that is in the same ontological category as x and that is 
true if and only if x is true and that is nevertheless not identical to x. 
Therefore, x fails to satisfy a principle of extensionality and, hence, is 
an intensional entity. Sets, by contrast, are extensional entities. To 
illustrate, let x be some set, either null or non-null. There is an item 
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(i.e., any non-null set) that is in the same ontological category as x and 
that is in the range of the copula 'is a member of'. So the principle of 
extensionality relevant to x is the one stated in terms of 'is a member 
of'. However, there is no item (besides x itself) that is in the same 
ontological category as x and that has for members exactly the items 
that are members of x. So x satisfies this principle of extensionality and, 
thus, is an extensional entity. 
A leading way of trying to justify a theory of properties, relations, 
and propositions is to show that it provides the best background theory 
in which to develop a theory of language, specifically, a theory of the 
semantics of natural languages. Advocates of this approach hold that 
predicates, verb phrases, and open-sentences express properties or 
relations and that sentences express propositions. But many people 
(Quine, Davidson, and others) are skeptical that these bits of language 
really express anything at all because they are skeptical that there is 
any such thing as meaning above and beyond what can be captured 
by a theory of reference and truth. Supporters of PRP semantics are 
undaunted by this skepticism because they think PRPs are in any event 
needed for giving a theory of reference and truth, and as long as PRPs 
are needed there, it would be pointless not to use them in a theory of 
meaning. The reason PRPs are needed in a theory of reference and 
truth is that there are special syntactic constructions - 'that'-clauses, 
gerundive phrases, infinitive phrases, and the like - that behave as 
singular terms, and to give the truth-conditions for sentences containing 
these singular terms, which are called intensional abstracts, we seem 
forced to assign references to them. When we do so, PRPs are the 
simplest and most natural choice because (except in certain problem 
cases) their identity conditions mirror beautifully the intensional substi-
tutivity conditions on expressions occurring within intensional abstracts. 
This is the meeting of the ontological and logico-linguistic uses of 
'intensional': the identity conditions of these intensional entities mirror 
the substitutivity conditions of the intensional abstracts that denote 
these entities. (This line of argument was developed in detail in my 
book Quality and Concept.) 
There is a growing consensus among philosophers, logicians, and 
linguists that this match-up between intensional entities and intensional 
abstracts establishes two prominent features . First, PRPs are at least in 
some cases very fine-grained entities. The argument is that the sub-
stitutivity conditions governing the intensional abstracts that denote 
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these PRPs are very fine-grained. (I will return to this argument for 
fine-grainedness later.) Because the distinctions among these PRPs are 
so fine, we may without being too misleading talk as though the PRPs 
denoted by syntactically complex intensional abstracts are themselves 
"complex" entities. In the same vein, we may say that these complex 
PRPs have "constituents" that are associated with relevant syntactic 
constituents of the denoting intensional abstracts. (I should emphasize 
that on the algebraic approach developed in Quality and Concept this 
talk of "comglexity" and "constituency" is not to be taken as literal 
part/ whole talk; it is heuristic only.) The second prominent feature is 
that (a theory of) PRPs may be expected to be type-free. But what does 
'type-free' mean? This is the first question I will investigate. 
2. SIX TYPES OF TYPE-FREEDOM 
There has been a good bit of terminological confusion in recent dis-
cussions of this matter.1 There are at least six independent notions of 
type-freedom, each of which is disallowed by classical type theorists 
such as Russell and Church. It would be good to begin by spelling them 
out briefly. 
(1) Transcendental predicates. The first way in which a theory of 
PRPs may be said to be type-free is for it to contain transcendental 
predicates (in the Aristotelian sense), that is, predicates that apply 
freely across metaphysical categories: for example, predicates like 'con-
template', 'think of ', 'is self-identical', 'is some kind of item or other', 
and so forth. 2 
(2) Universal universal quantification. To say the general things we 
would like to say with transcendental predicates (e.g., 'For all x, x = x '), 
we need a sort of variable (or similar device) whose values range freely 
over the entire universe of discourse. The second way in which a theory 
may be said to be type-free is for it to contain variables like this and 
quantifiers to go with them. In this case, we may call the universal 
quantifier a universal universal quantifier. 
(3) lmpredicative intensional abstracts. A third type of type-freedom 
concerns the kinds of quantifier phrases - specifically, the quantified 
variables - that are permitted to occur within intensional abstracts. 
The theory may be called type-free if the values of these quantified 
variables include the very PRP denoted by the intensional abstract 
itself. For example, the following intuitively valid sentence contains an 
example of this kind of quantification within an intensional abstract: 
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That Descartes doubts everything implies that Descartes 
doubts that Descartes doubts everything. 
In symbols, 
[(Vx)Ddx] Implies [Dd[(Vx)Ddx]]. 
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Formulas containing quantifiers like this were called impredicative by 
Russell, and they are, of course, ruled out in ramified type theories like 
those of Russell and of Church. 
( 4) Self-embedded predicates. The fourth type of type-freedom is 
also illustrated by this example. Consider the second intensional 
abstract '[Dd[(V x)Ddx]]'. The first occurrence of the predicate 'doubts' 
takes as an argument the intensional abstract ' [(V x)Ddx]' which con-
tains the very same predicate 'doubts' once again. Now one might think 
that this kind of self-embedding is only an appearance, specifically, that 
the two superficially similar predicates ('doubts' and 'doubts') are really 
semantically distinct. But Davidson has argued that human beings can 
learn only a finite number of semantically primitive constants and, 
therefore, that in an ideal representation of the syntax of natural 
languages there should also be a finite number of semantically primitive 
constants. Because verbs like 'doubts' can be self-embedded any (finite) 
number of times, the only way to meet Davidson's finiteness require-
ment is to hold that the supply of semantical primitives must eventually 
give out. Consequently, once a certain depth of embedding is reached, 
all more deeply embedded occurrences of the predicate 'doubts' must 
be semantically the same as some earlier one. Hence, genuinely self-
embedded occurrences are unavoidable. Given a PRP semantics, there-
fore, there will be propositions that contain as constituents a relation of 
doubting tl}at is predicated of a proposition that contains as a con-
stituent the very same relation of doubting. In this sense we may say 
that, not only is the predicate 'doubt' self-embeddable, but also the 
relation of doubting is self-embeddable. So, for example, we get decom-
position trees like this: 
[F[Fy]] 
~ 
pred [Fu],, [Fy] 
~ pred [Fu],, y 
( ') #'" 
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where pred is the operation of singular predication. (The intensional 
abstract '[Fu]u' denotes the property of being an item u such that Fu. 
Incidentally, it is quite wrong to use .A-notation for PRPs. The A.-
notation has a well-established use for functional-abstraction. So using 
it for PRP abstraction invites conceptual confusion. Properties are very 
different from functions, including propositional functions. And pro-
positions intuitively bear no resemblance at all to functions. Much more 
will be said on this later. To avoid this confusion with functions, I use 
my bracket-notqtion to denote PRPs.) 
(5) Self-constituency. A fifth way in which PRPs could be type-free 
would be for PRPs to be not just self-embedded but also constituents of 
themselves. This is quite a different affair, which would occur if in a 




pred [Fu]u [Fy] . 
Perhaps among the things I perceive when I look in a mirror is an item 




pred ~see u],, y. 
Or if the sentence 'I think this' [i.e ., this very thought itself] expresses a 
proposition (that is, if this = the proposition that I think this), it would 
have a decomposition tree like the following: 
this 
~ 
pred ~think u]u this . 
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If the Liar sentence ('This is false') or the Truth-teller sentence ('This is 




pred [ u is false]u this pred [ u is true]u this. 
These trees are non-well-founded inasmuch as some of their branches 
do not terminate but instead cycle. PRPs with non-well-founded decom-
position trees may be called type-free for the following reason. If a well-
foundedness condition were imposed on PRP-decomposition trees , it 
would induce a type structure. Specifically, higher-level nodes can be 
built from lower level nodes but not vice versa; therefore, one could say 
that higher level nodes are of a higher type than their lower level nodes. 
Such a type structure is built into in ramified type theories like those of 
Russell and of Church. But it is absent if non-well-founded PRP-trees 
are allowed. (This type of type freedom might bring to mind the way in 
which the type structure implicit in the iterative hierarchy is absent in a 
non-well-founded set theory, but it is really a very different logical 
phenomenon. Some situation semanticists have tried to treat the former 
type of type freedom as a special case of the latter. I will show why this 
is confused in a moment.) 
(6) Self-instantiation. A sixth way in which a PRP theory can be 
type-free arises in connection with predication relations. Predication 
relations are expressed in natural language by the copulas appropriate 
to properties and relations, that is, verb phrases such as 'is', 'is an 
instance of ', 'is related by', 'has', 'falls under', and so forth. [The relation 
implicit in higher-order "sentences" like 'runs(runs)' and 'red(red)' and 
higher-order "open-sentences" like 'x(x)' may also be counted as a 
. predication relation.] The theory would be type-free if it contains true 
sentences or theorems asserting the existence of properties that are 
instances of themselves (or instances of instances of themselves, or the 
like). Being self-identical has the property of being self-identical; being 
liked by someone has the property of being liked by someone; and so 
forth . In theories of this sort, one often asserts the existence of a 
universal property, that is, a property of which everything is an instance 
including the universal property itself. Of course, as soon as one 
permits self-instantiation, one gets a host of difficult problems. Not only 
l ' ~ 
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Cantor-style, Burali-Forti-style, and Russell-style paradoxes, but also 
philosophically loaded questions such as: what is the cardinality of the 
property of being uniquely self-instanced, i.e., [ u is the unique instance 
of u]u? And once self-instantiation is permitted, one also wonders 
whether there could be any good reason not to require every satis-
factory PRP theory to provide all of the properties needed to validate 
Frege's highly intuitive analysis of number. (Such a theory would have 
to posit the property of being a property with one instance, the property 
of being a property with two instances, and so forth.) 
Now in Russellian or Churchian ramified type theories there are type 
restrictions ruling out each of these six types of type-freedom: no 
transcendental predicates, no universal universal quantification, no 
impredicative intensional abstracts, no self-embedding, no self-constitu-
ency, and no self-instantiation. 
When I wrote Quality and Concept, one of my goals was to develop 
a framework for PRP theories that could be type-free in each of these 
six ways. Let me summarize briefly what my strategy was. (1) The way 
to model transcendental predicates is to begin with a single ·infinite 
domain in which all categories of entities - PRPs and non-PRPs alike 
- are treated on a par as primitive entities. Accordingly, when we 
assign an extension to a predicate the extension may include objects in 
any metaphysical category in this unitary domain. (2) Universal uni-
versal quantification is then automatic; we simply have variables whose 
range of values is the whole domain. (3) PRPs in the domain are related 
to one another algebraically. Specifically, PRPs denoted by complex 
intensional abstracts are the result of applying appropriate logical 
operations (conjunction, negation, existential generalization, singular 
predication, etc.) to relevant PRPs and nonPRPs in the domain. Im-
predicativity is then achieved simply by setting up the domain so that in 
the appropriate way it is closed under these logical operations, in 
particular, under the operation of generalization. ( 4) Likewise, self-
embedding is achieved as a byproduct of the fact that in the appro-
priate way the domain is closed under the operation of predication. 
Singular predication (pred, for short) is an operation that takes n-ary 
in tensions [ Ru1 ... Un - I un],,, ... 11,, - I 11,, (for n ~ 1) and items x to n -
1-ary intensions [Ru 1 • •• u11 _ 1 x J,, , ... u,, _ , . In the limiting case, then, pred 
would take, say, the relation of liking and the relation of liking to the 
property of liking the relation of liking: 
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pred([u likes v]u 0 , [u likes vJuv) = [u likes [u likes v]u 0 ]u . 
This illustrates how self-embedding is achieved simply by closing the 
domain under the operation pred. (5) Self-constituency is achieved just 
by permitting decomposition trees in which PRPs occur on paths 
descending from themselves. In Quality and Concept, there is a fully 
developed theory for PRPs with self-constituency, namely, the theory 
for PRPs on the coarse-grained conception (according to which neces-
sarily equivalent PRPs are identical). According to this conception, 
every PRP has infinitely many non-well-founded decomposition trees. 
Consider an example. Because [Fx]x and [Fx & [Fx]x = [Fx] x]x are 
. necessarily equivalent properties, they are identical on the coarse-
grained conception. So the property [Fx]x (i.e., [Fx & [Fx]x = [Fx]x]x) 
has a decomposition tree in which [Fx] x occurs on a path descending 
from itself : 
~ 
conj [Fx]x [[Fx]x = [Fx]xJx-
By the same token, one can model self-constituency on various fine-
grained conceptions of PRPs. To achieve this, one needs no revisions in 
the background set theory (as is the case in situation semantics, for ex-
ample). All that is needed is to set up the model with one trivial feature: 
the logical operations are permitted to cycle. Non-well-founded oper-
ations like this are commonplace in all familiar well-founded set theo-
ries. For example, the operation that takes integers x to -x and -x 





No revisions in the background set theory are needed. 
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The first five types of type-freedom are thus unproblematic on the 
Quality and Concept approach. Before turning to the sixth type of type 
freedom, I will say a few words about alternate approaches to the first 
five types of type freedom. First, the standard extensionalist approach. 
This approach to modeling PRPs is to begin with a domain of non-
PRPs (usually just particulars) and then to try to construct PRPs from 
these items by means of various set-theoretic operations. The possible-
worlds approach is an example of this approach; it is distinctive only 
because it begins with a domain of individuals most of which are not 
actual. (This is 'something I do not favor philosophically. I am inclined 
to accept realism in the primary sense defined by Alonzo Church: 
namely, that there are only real things, that there are no unreal things. 
To me it seems intuitive that whatever is real is actual.) The kind of 
categorial semantics originally formulated by Richard Montague is an 
example of the standard extensionalist approach to modeling PRPs 
inasmuch as it is based on the possible-worlds method. (The theory 
developed by M. Cresswell in Structured Meanings is a special hybrid 
of the standard extensionalist approach, and it has each of the dif-
ficulties that I describe below.) 
However, the standard extensionalist approach is beset with dif-
ficulties. In the present paper I will mention only those difficulties 
having to do with type freedom. Specifically, it is unable to represent 
transcendental predicates, self-embedding, and self-constituency. For 
example, on this approach there will be no (set-theoretic surrogate for 
the) transcendental, self-embedded relation of liking. In this connection, 
there will be no (set-theoretic surrogate for the) proposition that some-
one likes the relation of liking. (In symbols, [(:lx)x likes [ u likes v]uu].) 
Moreover, there will be no (set-theoretic surrogate for the) transcen-
dental, self-embedded relation of identity; nor is there a (set-theoretic 
surrogate for the) proposition that identity is identical to identity. (In 
symbols, [[x = Y]xy = [x = Y]xy]·) The only way for advocates of the 
standard extensionalist approach (possible-worlds theorists, original 
Montague-style categorial semanticists, etc.) to compensate is to resort 
to a non-standard set theory that posits ill-founded "sets": x E ... E x. 
This, I will argue in a moment, is too a big price for anyone to pay at 
this stage of research. 
Now in situation semantics, by contrast to the standard extensionalist 
approach, transcendental properties and self-embedded properties can 
be modeled without resorting to ill-founded "sets" because, just as on 
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the algebraic approach developed in Quality and Concept, properties 
and relations are taken at face value as irreducible entities. (In what 
follows, each of my criticisms applies not only to situation semantics 
but also to the approaches taken in Scott Soames' "Direct Reference 
and Propositional Attitudes" and Nathan Salmon's Frege's Puzzle.) But 
for some unexplained reason, situation semanticists go only half way: 
still under the spell of the reductionistic urge of the standard exten-
sionalist approach, situation semanticists (and Soames and Salmon) try 
to use set theory to construct situations (and propositions) and complex 
properties and relations out of basic properties and relations and 
individuals. For example, situation semanticists identify situations with 
ordered sets of basic properties and relations and individuals, or they 
identify situations with partial functions from times to such ordered 
sets. Thus, just as with the standard extensionalist approach - e.g., the 
possible-worlds approach or the original Montague-style categorial 
semantics - these "semi-reductionistic" approaches would have us 
believe that situations (and propositions) and complex properties and 
relations are ordered sets or functions. 
I will state three basic problems with these "semi-reductionistic" 
approaches. First, is it at all plausible that, when a person sees that the 
glass is half full, the person is perceiving an ordered set or a function? 
People who hold this kind of thing have lost their "semantic innocence." 
If, instead, we take all intensions at face value as irreducible entities -
either basic qualities, basic relations, or nonbasic items resulting from 
logical combinations of basic items - these counterintuitive conse-
quences are avoided. Situations could thus be easily accommodated 
within our PRP theory. Indeed, a satisfactory situation theory is just a 
component of any comprehensive PRP theory. 
The second problem with these semi-reductionistic approaches (i.e., 
the approaches of Barwise and Perry, of Soames, and of Salmon) is that 
they take coarse-grained properties and relations as given entities 
without providing any theory for them. Coarse-grained PRPs form that 
natural family of intensions that are identical whenever they are neces-
sarily equivalent. Consider shapes, for example. The shapes trilateral 
and triangular are necessarily equivalent, and intuitively, they are one 
and the same shape. Likewise, for all other qualities: they are identical 
if necessarily equivalent. Basic relations (connections, as I call them) are 
like this, too. For example, if knowing and having a justified true belief 
are necessarily equivalent relations, then knowing just is the same thing 
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as having a justified true belief. And it seems that situations in nature 
are also like this. The lake's being half full and lake's being half empty 
are, intuitively, the same natural situation (condition, state of affairs, 
phenomenon). (Of course, the concept of being trilateral # the concept 
of being triangular; the concept of knowing # the concept of having a 
justified true belief; the thought that the lake is half full # the thought 
that the lake is half empty. Concepts and thoughts are fine-grained 
intensions.) How would semi-reductionists formulate a theory of coarse-
grained intensions (and of coarse-grained intensional abstraction)? The 
possible-worlds approach is unsatisfactory, as we have seen. An algebraic 
approach is the only viable approach known. (For reasons I will give 
below, a propositional-function approach is unsatisfactory.) But if an 
algebraic approach is needed here, there can be no good reason for 
not using an algebraic approach to treat fine-grained intensions as 
well. By identifying fine-grained intensions with set-theoretic constructs 
(ordered sets, partial functions, etc.) and by treating coarse-grained 
intensions algebraically, semi-reductionists would end up with a dis-
unified, ad hoc theory. By contrast, if one uses an algebraic approach 
to treat both fine-grained and coarse-grained intensions, the result is a 
unified, natural theory. 
The third problem with the semi-reductionistic approaches concerns 
self-constituency. When situation semantics tries to model this phe-
nomenon, it loses a primary gain it made over the standard exten-
sional approach. We saw that, to model transcendental predicates and 
self-embedding, the standard extensional approach (e.g., the possible-
worlds approach) was forced to invoke a non-well-founded "set" theory. 
By taking properties and relations at face value as irreducible entities, 
semi-reductionists are able to avoid this theoretically unwise move. But 
to model self-constituency, semi-reductionists are themselves forced to 
invoke a non-well-founded set theory. So what once seemed to be a 
gain over the standard extensionalist approach is lost if self-constituency 
is incorporated: non-well-founded set theory must be adopted. 
There are two grave problems with adopting this radical theoretical 
architecture. First, according to the majority of Set theorists, it is just 
logically impossible for sets (in contradistinction properties) to be non-
well-founded. To these set theorists, talking of non-well-founded sets is 
just a category mistake, like talking of objects with shapes but no size. 
Second, and methodologically more serious, this move forces one at 
this very early, mathematically elementary stage of inquiry to take a 
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stand on how ultimately to solve the set-theoretical paradoxes. But 
methodologically this is a grave mistake. In the foreseeable future it is 
highly unlikely that we are really going to understand the pathology of 
these paradoxes or that we are really going to know what form an ideal 
resolution of them should take. It would be hubris to think otherwise. 
So an approach that unnecessarily forces us into taking a stand on these 
insolubilia is decisively less desirable than an approach that does not 
force us to do this. 
For this reason, therefore, our nonreductionistic algebraic approach 
to PRPs is superior. Because we do not identify fine-grained intensions 
with sets but instead take them at face value as irreducible entities, we 
can straightforwardly model self-constituency without adopting any 
position on how to resolve the set-theoretical paradoxes; we need only 
have decomposition trees with nonterminating branches, a common-
place in any set theory. 
Summing up. On grounds of intuition, theoretical unity, and metho-
dology, our algebraically motivated PRP theory provides a decisively 
better way to represent the first five types of type-freedom. But what 
about the last type of type freedom - self-instantiation? 
(6) In Quality and Concept my methodological idea was to separate 
issues of the logical paradoxes from issues in intensional logic as such 
- that is, to separate issues of the paradoxes from issues of the logic 
for linguistic contexts in which standard substitutivity principles do not 
hold. The way to do this is to construct a first-order theory for inten-
sional abstraction and then, at a later stage, to single out a distinguished 
logical constant for the predication relation and to construct a theory 
for it. This way the logical paradoxes and their resolution can be 
confined to this later stage. 
How are the paradoxes to be resolved ideally? Does anyone really 
know? I do not think so, and I think it is unrealistic to think that this 
situation is likely to change substantially any time soon. However, it is 
relatively straightforward to adapt the known approaches to the para-
doxes to first-order intensional logic. As an illustration, I indicated in 
Quality and Concept (a) how an iterative approach could be followed 
and (b) by invoking the idea of context-relativity (which Charles 
Parsons and Tyler Burge favor), a resolution of the liar paradox could 
be incorporated. But this was only an illustration, as I made clear in the 
book. I also stated that a "fixed-point" approach like that of Gilmore 
and Feferman would also be attractive and easy to adapt to our first-
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order intensional logic. I am very pleased now to see that this general 
idea has been studied in depth by a number of people - Bill Reinhardt, 
Peter Aczel, Raymond Turner, Gennaro Chierchia, and others. Some 
people have mistakeningly thought that in the book I was advocating 
the iterative approach, which standardly prohibits self-instantiation, 
over approaches (like fixed-point approaches or Michael Jubien's 
approach) that allow self-instantiation. But I explicitly stated otherwise. 
The reason that I did not pursue either the iterative approach or a 
fixed-point apprbach in greater detail is that I believe, and continue 
to believe, that, although they are extremely elegant and very useful 
theoretically, they still do not yield a full understanding and resolution 
of these pathologies. For all we know, this theoretical ideal lies beyond 
our abilities. For this reason, the two-stage methodology I have urged 
seems unassailable. I can see nothing short of a full ideal resolution of 
the paradoxes that could justify anyone in departing from it. 
A special advantage of this two-stage methodology is that it permits 
one to construct complete theories of PRPs at the first stage, i.e., 
complete logics for first-order languages with identity and intensional 
abstraction. In Quality and Concept I showed that such first-order 
intensional logics are complete relative to certain technical notions of 
validity that are defined by means of the intensional algebraic semantic 
method, and I advanced the philosophical thesis that these technical 
notions of validity are in fact the standard notions of validity (or at least 
that they resemble the standard notions in all respects relevant to 
genuine completeness results). From the technical result and the philo-
sophical thesis it follows that first-order intensional logic is genuinely 
complete. 
This argument is parallel to that used to show that elementary first-
order logic with identity is genuinely complete: the logic is proved 
complete relative to a certain defined notion of validity, and this 
technical result is then combined with the philosophical thesis that this 
defined notion is the same as (or resembles in philosophically relevant 
respects) the standard notion. In the case of elementary first-order logic 
with identity, the philosophical thesis has been subjected to much 
critical scrutiny, and something like a consensus has emerged in sup-
port of it. In the case of first-order intensional logic, the philosophical 
thesis strikes many people as highly intuitive. Nevertheless, some com-
mentators (for example, Nino Cocchiarella and I. G. McFetridge) have 
expressed doubts.3 According to such doubts, the technical complete-
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ness result might be a mere artifact of a mistakenly narrow definition of 
validity that results from using an overly liberal definition of a model 
(in much the same way that Henkin's quasi-completeness result for 
higher-order extensional logic is a consequence of the liberal notion of 
a general model). Specifically, if certain appropriate auxiliary closure 
conditions were imposed on the models, perhaps completeness would 
no longer follow; perhaps incompleteness could be derived. So go the 
doubts. However, these doubts are unfounded as I will now explain. 
In intensional algebraic semantics, a model consists of D, P, K, G, 
Id, Nee, T, conj, neg, exist , predk> I. D is an infinite domain. P is a 
prelinear ordering on D that induces a partition of D into subdomains 
D_ 1, D0 , D 1, D2 , ..• (thought of as being comprised, respectively, of 
nonPRPs, propositions, properties, binary relations, ternary relations, 
etc.). K is a class of functions on D telling us the alternate (or possible) 
extensions that the elements of D have. (For example, for each extension 
function Hin Kand each property u in D 1, H(u) is a subset of D.) G is a 
distinguished function in K that tells us the actual extensions of elements 
of D. Id is a distinguished element of D2 to be thought of as the identity 
relation; accordingly, for all Hin K, H(ld) = {xy E D: x = y \ . Nee is 
a distinguished element of D 1 to be thought of as the property of neces-
sity; accordingly, for all Hin K, H(Nec) = {x E D0 : H'(x) = T for all 
H' E K ) . T is a class of transformations, which are functions that take 
relations to, say, their converses, reflexivizations, expansions, and so 
forth. The remaining items are basic logical operations for conjunction, 
negation, existential generalization, and predication. (For example, 
conj([Fx]x, [Gx]x) = [Fx & Gx]x; neg([Fx]x) = [ 1Fx]x; exist([Fx]x) = 
[(3x)Fx]; pred0([Fx]x, v) = [Fv]; pred0([Fx]x, [Gy]y) = [F[Gy]y], 
pred 1([Fx]x, [Gy]y) = [F[Gy]]y; pred2([Fx]x, [Ryz]yz) = [F[RyzlJyz; etc.) 
Finally, I is an interpretation of our first-order intensional language. 
Specifically, I a function that assigns to variables elements of D and 
that assigns to n-ary predicates elements of D,,; moreover, I('=') is Id 
and l('N') =Nee. ('N' is a distinguished 1-ary predicate for necessity. If 
other distinguished logical properties and relations besides Nee and Id 
were adjoined to our models, corresponding distinguished logical 
predicates could then be adjoined to the language.) Denotation and 
truth in a model may then be defined inductively. In turn, validity may 
be defined as truth in all models. We can show that, relative to this 
notion of validity, the valid formulas of our first-order intensional 
language have a complete axiomatization. 
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Now consider two strong closure conditions on models (described 
by Cocchiarella and McFetridge, respectively). First, the set K of 
alternate extension functions must always be maximal, that is, it should 
not be possible to add further . extension functions H to K without 
contradicting one of the original conditions in the definition of model. 
Second, for every subset s of D and every extension function H in K, 
there must be an item x in the subdomain D 1 of properties such that 
H(x) = s. (Notice that, if a model satisfies this closure condition, D 
must be a proper class. For the closure condition implies that there are 
as many properties in D as there are subsets of D. So if D were a set, 
the closure condition would contradict Cantor's power-set theorem.) 
THEOREM. First-order intensional logic is complete even if the strong 
closure conditions are imposed on models. 
In broad outline the proof goes as follows. We follow the Henkin-style 
proof given in Quality and Concept except that a proper class of 
individual constants are adjoined to the language, and for all distinct 
individual constants c and d, the sentence c ~ d is adjoined to the 
theory. In the Henkin model that results, these individual constants will 
comprise the subdomain of individuals. To obtain a model meeting the 
second closure condition, we massage this model in appropriate ways. 
First, partition this subdomain into denumerably many proper classes 
d_ 1, d0 , d 1, d2, ••• The first of these proper classes d_ 1 will be the 
subdomain of individuals in our new model. Then the i-th proper 
classes (i ~ 0) will be adjoined to the old subdomain Di to form the 
new subdomain of i-ary intensions, and the functions H in K and the 
fundamental logical operations will be adjusted accordingly. When done 
properly the result is a model of the theory that meets the second 
closure condition. What makes this construction possible is the fact that 
our models have a single, unified domain D in which individuals, 
propositions, properties, and relations are taken as primitive entities. 
Finally, concerning the first closure condition, it is straightforward to 
show that every K -maximal extension of the new model is also a model 
of the theory. The key to the proof is the fact that, for any algebraic 
intensional model, the values of all identity and necessity sentences 
must be the same in a K -extension of a model as they are in the model 
itself.4 
This and similar results provide strong evidence that doubts about 
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the genuine completeness of first-order intensional logic are unfounded 
and that the two-stage methodology (according to which intensional 
logic is treated prior to treating the logic for the predication relation) is 
vindicated. 5 
3. HOW TO DEAL WITH TYPE FREEDOM IN SEMANTICS 
We have seen that a common way of justifying an ontology of PRPs is 
to show that this ontology is called for in semantics: given that PRPs are 
what predicates and sentences mean and given that PRPs are what 
intensional abstracts denote, a theory characterizing the semantical 
features of a language must make ontological commitment to PRPs. But 
how extensive must this commitment be? The answer is that it can be 
relatively weak, as I will show. 
My remarks are organized around the question of how a semantical 
theory should deal with the various types of type freedom. The answer 
to this question depends on one's goals. Suppose that one's goal is to 
state what the expressions in an arbitrary language mean. If the con-
stants of the language have synonyms in the language of one's PRP 
theory (or if, as a limiting case, the language is the language of the PRP 
theory), we can accomplish the goal by an axiomatic theory. Such a 
theory would have the following schema for (closed) sentences 'A' and 
open-sentences 'Bu 1 ••• un': 
'A' means [A]. 
'Bu 1 ••• u"' means [Bu 1 ••• unJ,,,. u"· 
where 'means' is taken as a primitive constant. For example, 'Something 
runs' means (expresses) the proposition that something runs, and 'u 1 
runs' means (expresses) the property of being a u 1 such that u 1 runs. 
All that is needed is a background PRP theory that is fitted out with 
intensional abstraction. An advantage of this approach is that PRP 
semanticists need not take any stand on the question of self-constituency 
and self-instantiation, which are the two most controversial types of 
type freedom. 
Next suppose that one wishes to specify (perhaps in an indefinite 
way) what the expressions in an arbitrary language mean, where the 
primitive vocabulary of the language exceeds that of the language of our 
background PRP theory. For example, if 'Fu' expresses the property x 
and 'Gu' expresses the property y, what do 'Fu & Gu', '1Fu', and 
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'F[Gu]u' mean? To do this kind of general semantics, I see no alterna-
tive but to adopt a PRP theory that posits fundamental logical opera-
tions such as conjunction, negation, singular prediction, and so forth. 
The most straightforward way to formulate such a theory is to adjoin to 
one's background PRP theory distinguished logical predicates for these 
operations ('Conj3', 'Neg2 ', 'Pred 3 ', and so forth). For example, 'Fu & 
Gu' would mean the property z such that Conj3xyz; '-iFu' would mean 
the property z such that Neg 2xz; and 'F[Gu]u' would mean the proposi-
tion z such that Pred 3 xyz. An advantage of this approach is that, as 
before, PRP semanticistS' need not take a stand on whether there is any 
self-constituency or self-instantiation. If such phenomena truly exist, 
they will automatically be accommodated by this approach; no special 
logical apparatus or associated principles would be needed.6 
Now a property theory with a primitive intensional abstraction opera-
tion and distinguished logical predicates for identity and the predication 
relation (but no distinguished logical predicates for the fundamental 
logical operations) might also be able to do this kind of semantics just 
discussed. In light of new work [such as that of Gennaro Chierchia and 
Raymond Turner (1987) and Turner (1987)], this approach appears 
promising. There are, however, two potential worries. First, it would 
require PRP semanticists to take intensional abstraction as a primitive 
(rather than defined) operation. This in turn would require us to accept 
an ultimate bifurcation of logic into extensional and intensional (rather 
than to explain prima facie intensional constructions as surface phe-
nomena definable within a logical setting that is thoroughly extensional).7 
Second, this approach requires PRP semanticists to take a stand on 
how ideally to resolve the paradoxes involving the predication relation. 
But for the purposes at hand nothing forces PRP semanticists to take 
on this heavy challenge. Therefore, it would be methodologically much 
wiser to defer this challenge. In view of these two drawbacks, it is hard 
to see why we should not adopt the neutral and secure semantical 
method sketched earlier. 
Suppose one wished to define (by an inductive-turned-direct defini-
tion) the constant 'mean' as it occurs in the style of semantical theory 
sketched above, including as a limiting case a semantical theory for the 
very language in which the semantical theory is stated. This can be done 
using no additional machinery beyond that of a standard well-founded 
set theory. No commitment to self-constituency or self-instantiation 
must be made. The reason standard well-founded set theory suffices is 
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that there is no reason in the semantic theory to assert any special 
relationships between PRPs and sets (for example, that for every set, 
there are infinitely many properties whose instances are exactly the 
elements of that set). As far as the set theory is concerned, the PRPs 
collected in a set are on a par with particulars or any other primitive 
urelements. As a result, the sets needed to validate an inductive-turned-
direct definition of the meaning relation over the field of linguistic 
expressions and PRPs can be standard well-founded sets. 
Semanticists can thus do a considerable amount of semantics without 
even using a distinguished logical predicate for the predication relation. 
Consequently, the question of self-instantiation does not even come up 
at this stage of semantical theorizing. In semantics, it becomes necessary 
to use a constant for the predication relation only when one wishes to 
supplement one of the above theories of meaning with a theory of truth 
conditions. To obtain such a theory, we adopt the following definitions: 
and 
A predicate or open sentence is true of an item if and only if 
the item is an instance of the property that is the meaning of 
the predicate or open sentence. 
A sentence is true if and only if the proposition that is the 
meaning of the sentence is a true proposition. 
Here, and not before, does it become necessary for semanticists to 
use a constant for the predication (instantiation) relation. Once this is 
available, one can define truth for propositions. However, truth for 
propositions can be defined without explicitly supposing that any prop-
erties are instances of themselves. Instead, the following sort of defini-
tion suffices for this purpose: 
. [A] is true if and only if (3 u) u is an instance of [AL. 
(Or more generally, x is true iffdr(3u) u is an instance of exp(x). The 
operation exp is the distinguished logical operation that adds on an 
extra degree to a PRP; for example, exp([Fa]) = [Fa]u and exp([Fu]u) = 
[FuJuv)· Concerning questions of self-constituency and self-instantiation, 
semanticists may, as before, remain neutral. These are independent 
questions in logical theory (or metaphysics) that do not arise when one 
is attempting simply to specify the conditions under which an expres-
sion is true of an object or the conditions under which a sentence is 
·~ 
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true. It is just not the business of semantics to say what expressions are 
true of what objects. For example, it is not the business of semantics to 
say whether the term 'spy' is true of a certain suspect; by the same 
token, it is not the business of semantics to say whether, say, the term 
'self-identical' is true of a certain metaphysically and epistemologically 
interesting suspect, namely, the very property of self-identity. The job 
of semantic theory here is at most to say under what conditions the 
expression would be true of the object. Similarly, it is not the job of 
semantics to say whether a sentence is true. For example, it is not the 
job of semantics to ,say whether '(3x)x = the most dangerous spy' is 
true. By the same token, it is not the job of semantics to say whether 
the self-constituency sentence '(3x)x = [x is not true]' is true. The job 
of semantics here is at most to say under what conditions the sentence 
would be true. As I have indicated, these semantical tasks can be 
achieved without making commitment to self-constituency or to self-
instantiation. 
So must semantics ever make a commitment to self-constituency or 
to self-instantiation? I submit that semanticists as semanticists can 
always remain neutral about whether there is or is not self-constituency. 
There are no issues in semantics (i.e., the theory of fundamental word-
world relations) that force one to take a stand here. The question of 
whether there is self-constituency belongs to logic (or metaphysics). If 
self-constituency should happen to exist, the logical apparatus suggested 
in the above PRP semantic methods would automatically accommodate 
it. No special steps need to be taken by semanticists as semanticists. 
(Later on, I will examine the philosophical arguments for and against 
self-constituency.) 
The situation with self-instantiation is somewhat similar. In virtually 
all intellectual settings, semanticists can remain neutral on the issue of 
self-instantiation. However, there is a special intellectual setting in 
which they might not. Namely, a setting in which, for reasons inde-
pendent of semantic theory, they hold that it is illegitimate to use set 
theory for any purpose. For example, advocates of certain no-class 
theories hold this because they think that there really are no such things 
as sets, that set theory is a mere artifice resulting from an erroneous 
conflation of certain natural notions such as property and ordinary 
aggregation. (See chapter 5 "Class" in Quality and Concept for a 
discussion of this thesis.) If a semanticist holds this position, then and 
only then might there be a need to posit self-instantiated properties. 
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And in this case, the need would arise only when one seeks to give a 
definition (inductive-turned-direct) of the meaning relation for the 
language of one's own semantic theory (or some language of equivalent 
expressive strength). If in this setting one does not have available any 
set theory for stating the definition, one must turn to a property theory 
for the machinery for turning the inductive definition into a direct 
definition. It is just here - and at no other place - that self-instantia-
tion is needed in semantics. Self-instantiation is unavoidable here, for 
the definition would be incorrect unless the pair ('means', meaning) is 
an instance of the meaning relation. And this is a case of self-instantia-
tion. The conclusion is that in semantics one can get on without positing 
self-instantiation unless one holds, for reasons independent of semantics, 
that sets are not real. And even then, one need not posit self-instantia-
tion at any point prior to giving a definition of the meaning relation for 
the language of one's own PRP theory (or a language of equivalent 
strength). If you do not hold that sets are not real, you will need to look 
beyond semantics proper for a reason to posit self-instantiation. (At the 
close of my remarks, I will indicate where you might look for such a 
reason.) 
On the view I have been advocating, semantics is a relatively weak 
discipline that can remain neutral on a great many issues that at 
bottom belong to logic or some other discipline outside linguistics. This 
view clashes with a more inflated conception of semantics that is 
fashionable in some contemporary circles. The inflated conception is, in 
my opinion, based on confusions about the proper boundaries between 
semantics and other disciplines (especially logic), confusions that blur 
the proper hierarchical organization of these disciplines. Logic is the 
theory of valid reasoning. On my view, the best development of logic is 
(or at least includes) a theory of PRPs. In this theory, validity (and also 
entailment and analyticity) is characterized in terms of various auxiliary 
notions - identity, contrariety, predication, truth, necessity, and so 
forth. These notions are purely logical, not linguistic. Semantics, by 
contrast, is the theory of the fundamental relations between words and 
the world. The most fundamental word/world relations are meaning 
and referring. (yVe need not take a stand here on the question of 
whether referring is a species of meaning or a relation derivative from 
meaning or a primitive relation in its own right.) Given the above 
purely logical notions and given the primary semantical notion of mean-
ing, a variety of derivative semantical notions are definable: synonyms 
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(=ctr expressions whose meanings are identical), antonyms ( = df expres-
sions whose meanings are contraries), a predicate true of an item (=dr 
an expression whose meaning has the item as an instance), true sen-
tence (=ctr a sentence whose meaning is a true proposition), necessary 
sentence (=dr a sentence whose meaning is a necessary proposition), 
valid sentence (=dr a sentence whose meaning is a valid proposition), 
and so forth. Accordingly, specific claims about these derivative matters 
- synonyms, antonyms, predicates true of items, true sentences, neces-
sary sentences, valid sentences, and so forth - result from a combining 
(1) these definitions, (2) elementary semantical facts about which PRPs 
are the meanings of which linguistic expressions, and (3) Ianguage-
independent facts about which PRPs are identical, contrary, instantiated, 
true, necessary, valid, and so forth. Semanticists have finished their job 
as semanticists when they have completed (1) and (2); issues concern-
ing (3) are not the province of semantics as such. In view of this, 
semanticists can and should remain neutral on a great many questions 
concerning (3), questions that properly belong to other disciplines. Such 
questions can be answered independently of linguistics, and once they 
are answered, the answers to the derivative semantical questions follow 
immediately and trivially, providing no new theoretical illumination. 
I am inclined to much the same view of thematic-role semantics. The 
elaborate structures posited there do not belong to semantics as such; 
they belong to epistemologically antecedent, more general a priori 
disciplines, namely, logic and metaphysics. The job of the lexical 
semanticist is merely to tell us what various lexical items mean. This 
can be done homophonically if the semantic metalanguage includes 
the object language. The rest of the work is done automatically by 
general logical and metaphysical principles that are wholly language-
independent. I have yet to see any linguistic examples that require 
abandoning this simple traditional epistemological picture of the hier-
archy of disciplines. 
4. AGAINST IDENTIFYING PROPERTIES AND 
PROPOSITIONAL FUNCTIONS 
Formalizations of PRP theory run into some technical complexities in 
connection with the treatment of free and bound terms occurring in 
PRP-abstracts.8 Many of these complexities can be avoided by adopting 
the thesis that properties and propositional functions are identical.9 The 
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purpose of this section is to present some significant reasons not to 
adopt this thesis despite its short-term technical advantages. 
Philosophically, the propositional-function thesis seems unacceptable 
on at least two counts. First, it is highly counterintuitive. How im-
plausible that familiar sensible properties are functions - the color of 
this ink, the aroma of coffee, the shape of your hand, the special 
painfulness of a burn or itchiness of a mosquito bite. No function is a 
color, a smell, a shape, or a feeling. Or consider the fact that navy blue 
is darker than yellow and that it covers the surface of my pen. No 
function is darker than another function, and no function covers the 
surface of my pen. To assert otherwise seems to be an old-fashioned 
category mistake.10 
In addition to intuitive objections to the propositional-function 
thesis, a second philosophical objection is that the thesis threatens the 
prospect of certain explanations in epistemology, phenomenology, and 
philosophical psychology. For example, how are we to explain what is 
going on in the interplay of sensation and cognition when a person sees 
that two objects have some sensible quality in common? Or how are we 
to explain why various shades of color can look so similar? At best, the 
identification of properties and propositional functions complicates our 
epistemology, phenomenology, and philosophical psychology in con-
nection with these and kindred phenomena. 
My aim, however, is not to dwell on such philosophical objections to 
the propositional-function thesis, serious as they are. Rather, my aim is 
to discuss four logical difficulties facing the thesis. 
(1) The first problem derives from the fact that functions are usually 
treated extensionally. That is, the following extensionality principle 
holds for all functions f and g: (Vx)(f(x) = g(x)) -+ f = g. But this is 
wrong. There always exist functions f and g such that, even though f 
and g yield the same values for the same actual arguments, they could 
yield different values for some possible arguments. That is, even though 
(Vx)(f(x) = g(x)), nevertheless <>(3x)(/(x) ~ g(x)). In this case, f ~ g. 
Hence, a counterexample to the extensionality principle. This problem 
could be overcome treating functions intensionally. To do this, one 
would reject the original extensionality principle; in its place, one might 
adopt a modal extensionality principle: D(Vx)(f(x) = g(x) -+ f = g. 
This move, however, does complicate things. 
(2) The second problem is far more serious. One of the main pur-
poses of PRP theory is to provide a logical framework for treating the 
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propositional attitudes - belief, decision, memory, and so forth . It is 
now widely recognized that the sort of propositions suited to serve as 
objects of the attitudes must be veryfine-grained. 11 For example, if two 
properties, say, being an x such that x Fs '/- being an x such that x Gs, 
then for every x, the proposition that x Fs '/- the proposition that x Gs. 
The intuitive idea here is that, if these two properties differ in any 
respect, then it will always be possible in principle for some person to 
have some propositional attitude to the proposition that x Fs and to fail 
to have that attitude toward the proposition that x Gs. Differences 
between properties are always reflected in differences between proposi-
tions formed from those properties. The logico-linguistic evidence 
supporting this principle of the distinctiveness among propositions is 
overwhelming. 
This principle of distinctness among propositions entails (by contra-
position and quantifier interchange) the following fine-grained principle 
of identity for properties: if, for some x, the proposition that x Fs = 
the proposition that x Gs, then being an x such that x Fs = being an 
x such that x Gs. This and kindred principles of property identity are 
formalized in my first-order PRP theory T2.12 These property-identity 
principles comprise pretty much the object-language statement of the 
fine-grained conception of synonymy that Alonzo Church calls synony-
mous isomorphism and that he believes is required for treating the 
propositional attitudes. Church arrived at his conception by tightening 
up Carnap's principle of intensional isomorphism in response to various 
counterexamples.13 Church has tried with very mixed success to formal-
ize his conception in a higher-order ramified intensional logic called 
Alternative (0). 14 
To show that it is a mistake to identify properties and propositional 
functions, we will make use of two intuitively compelling syntactic 
principles. First, if the word 'that' and a noun phrase a and a primitive 
verb phrase (i.e., a primitive predicate) 'Fs' are concatenated, the result 
is a well-formed 'that'-clause 'that a Fs'. Second, if 'x' is a variable and 
' Fs' is a primitive verb phrase 'being an x such that x Fs' is a well-
formed gerund. And we use the following semantical principles: 
(A) Any property can in principle be expressed by a primitive 
verb phrase 'Fs'. 
(B) If 'Fs' is a primitive verb phrase, the gerund 'being an x such 
that x Fs' denotes the property expressed by 'Fs'. 
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(C) If the variable 'x ' is assigned the individual x as its value and 
the primitive verb phrase 'Fs' expresses the property of 
being an x such that x Fs, then the 'that'-clause 'that x Fs' 
denotes the proposition that x Fs. 15 
(D) If 'Fs' and 'Gs' are primitives verb phrases, then the follow-
ing holds: 
If, for some x, that x Fs = that x Gs, then being an x such 
that x Fs =being an x such that x Gs. 
(E) If a variable 'x ' is assigned the individual x as its value and a 
primitive verb phrase 'Fs' expresses a propositional function 
f, then the 'that'-clause 'that x Fs' denotes the proposition 
that is the value off applied to argument x, that is , f( x). 
(A)- (C) are intuitively compelling principles of informal semantics. It 
would seem unreasonable to abandon these basic principles just to save 
the propositional-function thesis. (D) presents the fine-grained principle 
of property identity discussed above. (E) is a fundamental principle of 
all standard propositional-function semantic theories. (E) is a condi-
tional whose antecedent implies that the primitive verb phrase 'Fs' 
express a propositional function f However, given that the primitive 
verb phrase 'Fs' expresses a property, the antecedent of (E) implies that 
the propositional function f and this property are identical. If, as I 
maintain, this is false, then the entire conditional (E) is true. So we are 
free to use (E) in our argument against the propositional-function 
thesis . With principles (A)-(E) in place, we can now disprove the 
propositional-function thesis. Here is the proof. 
Proof Let g be a constant propositional function characterized by 
the equation: (Vu)(g(u) =the proposition that x flies), where xis some 
arbitrarily chosen item, say, the number nine. Then by the propositional-
function thesis, it follows that g is a property. So by (A), a primitive 
verb phrase 'Gs' could express g. Let the variable 'x' be assigned x (i.e., 
the number nine) as its value. Then, by (E), the 'that'-clause 'that x Gs' 
denotes the proposition that x flies. By (C), the 'that'-clause 'that x flies' 
denotes the proposition that x flies. So 'That x Gs = that x flies' is true 
on the above assignment. Therefore, the sentence 'For some x, that 
x Gs = that x flies' is true. Thus, by (D), 'being an x such that x Gs = 
being an x such that x flies ' is true. It follows that these two gerunds 
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denote the same property. Consequently, by (B), the primitive verb 
phrases 'Gs' and 'flies ' express the same property. Given the proposi-
tional-function thesis, this property is really a propositional function. 
But the propositional function expressed by 'Gs' is g, so it follows that 
'flies' expresses g. Now select some individual y that actually flies, say, 
this hummingbird, and let the variable 'y' be assigned y as its value. 
Given that the primitive verb phrase 'flies' expresses the propositional 
function g, it follows by (E) that the 'that'-clause 'that y flies ' denotes 
the proposition that' is the value of g applied to the argument y, that is, 
g(y). However, by g's characterizing equation, g(y) = the proposition 
that x flies (where x = the number nine). Thus, the 'that'-clause 'that y 
flies' denotes the proposition that x flies (where x = the number nine). 
However, by (B), 'that y flies' also denotes the proposition that y flies 
(where y = this hummingbird). It follows that the proposition that 
y flies = the proposition that x flies (where y = this hummingbird 
-:f 9 = x). But this is absurd. The proposition that y flies is true; the 
proposition that x ·flies is false. (This hummingbird flies; the number 
nine does not.) Since the propositional-function thesis leads to this 
absurdity, it follows that it is false. 16 
Two observations are in order. First, this argument does not show 
that propositional functions cannot be used in constructing models for 
intensional logic. In particular, one could construct artificial models 
such that every proposition in the model is the value of at most one 
propositional function in the model. In models like this the above sort 
of problem would not occur. Such models could be used for a variety of 
specific logical tasks. However, there is still a problem. None of these 
artificial models is a natural model of propositional functions , for in a 
natural model there will always be more than one - indeed, there will 
always be infinitely many - propositional functions having the same 
proposition as one of the values. [For example, in a natural model 
containing the natural numbers there will be infinitely many proposi-
tional functions g;, i ~ 1, that have as a value the proposition that 
0 = l; functions like this might be characterized thus: (V'x)(if x is a 
natural number less than i, then g;(x) = the proposition that 0 = 1; 
otherwise, g;(x) = the proposition that x = x).] But a condition of 
adequacy on any general semantical method is that the models it 
provides should include the natural model(s) for the entities it is 
supposed to model. Therefore, a general semantical method based on 
the above artificial models cannot be adequate. 
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The second observation concerns a weakening of the propositional-
function thesis . We know that, for every proposition, there are infinitely 
many propositional functions having that proposition as a value. But 
given (A)-(E), we have shown that at most one of these propositional 
functions could possibly be a property. So it appears that a propositional-
function theorist has no choice but to weaken the original propositional-
function thesis in the following way. Originally, the thesis was that all 
and only properties are (unary) propositional functions. According to 
the weakened thesis , all properties would still be (unary) propositional 
functions; however, the converse would not hold. On the contrary, 
most (unary) propositional functions would not be properties. [On this 
weakened thesis, the propositional function f having the following 
defining equation might be an example of a propositional function that 
is really a property (i.e., the property of flying): o (V' x) (f(x) = the pro-
position that x flies). By contrast, the propositional functions g; 
characterized above would not be genuine properties according to the 
weakened thesis.] True enough, this weakened propositional-function 
thesis avoids the difficulty given above. However, it does so at the price 
of making a mystery of the distinction between propositional functions 
that are supposed to be properties and those that are not. What is it 
about the propositional functions that are supposed to be properties 
that makes them special? The answer presumably is that these proposi-
tional functions are somehow more "natural" than others. The problem 
is that there evidently is no way to spell out clearly and precisely what 
this means without implicitly or explicitly using the logically prior idea 
of what it is to be a property (or related ideas not belonging to proposi-
tional-function theory as such). But if this is so, it would appear that 
despite its technical appeal, the weakened propositional-function thesis 
inevitably leaves something out; it masks the true logical structure of 
the subject. Conceptually, the right course is therefore to develop a 
theory of properties directly. Only such a theory can lay bare the true 
logical structure of PRPs. 
(3) The third problem I wish to raise confronts even the weakened 
thesis that all (but not only) properties are unary propositional func-
tions. As with the second problem, the third problem arises in the 
context of the logic for the propositional attitudes, which demands that 
very fine-grained distinctions be made among propositions. Let us 
introduce two new primitive verb phrases (primitive predicates) -
'rajneeshes' and 'fondalees' - by stipulating that: 
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(1) Being an x such that x rajneeshes = being an x such that x 
follows Rajneesh. 
(2) Being an x such that x fondalees = being an x such that 
Jane Fonda follows x. 17 
(Jane Fonda seems to follow many people as time goes on; maybe it 
will be Rajneesh next.) According to the propositional-function thesis, 
the following identities hold: 
(3) (h)(x rajheeshes) =being an x such that x rajneeshes. 
(4) (A.x)(x follows Rajneesh) = being an x such that x follows 
Rajneesh. 
(5) (A.y)(Y fondalees) =being a y such that y fondalees. 
(6) (A.y)(Jane Fonda follows y) = being a y such that Jane 
Fonda follows y. 
From (1 ), (3), and ( 4) it follows that: 
(A.x)(x rajneeshes) = (A.x)(x follows Rajneesh). 
Apply each side of this identity to the argument Jane Fonda. The result 
is: 
(A.x)(x rajneeshes)(Jane Fonda) 
= (h) (x follows Rajneesh) (Jane Fonda). 
Then by (C) and (E) we have: 
(7) The proposition that Jane Fonda rajneeshes = the proposi-
tion that Jane Fonda follows Rajneesh. 
Similarly, from (2), (5), and (6), it follows that: 
(A.y)(Y fondalees) = (A.y)(Jane Fonda follows y). 
Apply each side of this identity to the argument Rajneesh. The result is: 
(A.y)(Y fondalees)(Rajneesh) 
= (A.y)(Jane Fonda follows y)(Rajneesh). 
Then by (C) and (E), we have: 
(8) The proposition that Rajneesh fondalees = the proposition 
that Jane Fonda follows Rajneesh. 
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From (7) and (8) it follows that: 
The proposition that Jane Fonda rajneeshes = the proposi-
tion that Rajneesh fondalees. 
But this seems wrong. When a person consciously and explicitly thinks 
that Jane Fonda rajneeshes must that person be consciously and 
explicitly thinking that Rajneesh fondalees? It certainly does not seem 
so. 18 Thus, the weakened propositional-function thesis seems mistaken. 
We have isolated another prima facie difficulty in the propositional-
function thesis. It would be desirable to have a diagnosis of what has 
gone wrong. I will venture one, but I should emphasize that the prob-
lem should not be confused with the diagnosis (or with the technical 
apparatus used to state the diagnosis). Independently of the diagnosis, 
we have established that the propositional-function thesis leads to a 
prima facie problem. 
According to the diagnosis, the objects of the propositional attitudes 
are so fine-grained that in the case of relational propositions the order 
in which relations are predicated of arguments is reflected in the 
identity of the propositions that are the outcome. For example, the 
relational property rajneeshing results from predicating the binary 
relation of following of Rajneesh, and in turn the relational proposition 
that Jane Fonda rajneeshes results from predicating this property of 
Jane Fonda. On the other hand, the relational property fondaleeing 
results form predicating the inverse of the binary relation of following 
of Jane Fonda, and in turn the relational proposition that Rajneesh 
fondalees results from predicating this property of Rajneesh. In symbols, 
[Rf]= pred(pred([Fxy)xy, r),j) 'cf. pred(pred([Fxy)yx,f), r) =[Fr). 
The reason that the propositional-function approach does not mark the 
distinction between these two propositions is that the order in which 
the corresponding propositional functions are applied to the argument 
is not analogously reflected in the identity of the outcome: 
(h)(Rx)(j) = (A.xy)(Fxy)(j)(r) = (A.yx)(Fxy)(r)(j) = (A.y)(Fy)(r). 
Ironically, this and kindred phenomena are exactly the ones that make 
a propositional-function approach technically simpler than an approach 
that takes properties and relations as primitive entities not reducible to 
propositional functions. What the above example seems to show is that 
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this very simplification blurs genuine distinctions among the type of 
propositions that figure in the logic for the propositional attitudes.19 
I can think of two ways in which propositional-function theorists 
might try to regain the missing distinctions. First, they might try to 
regain them by introducing into their object theory a special primitive 
predicate for the application of a propositional function to an argu-
ment. For example, they might introduce the binary predicate 'App', 
where 'App(u, v)' is intended to mean the following: 
• 
The result of applying propositional function u to argument 
v is a true proposition. 
Then, if these propositional-function theorists are willing to give up 
principle (E), they could claim: 
(9) That Rf= that App((.A.x)(Fxr), f). 
and 
(10) That Fr= that App((.A.y)(Fjy), r). 
Because: 
That App((.A.x)(Fxr),j) # that App((.A.y)(Fjy), r). 
the missing distinction: 
That Rj # that Fr. 
would be regained. This is to say: 
That Jane Fonda rajneeshes # that Rajneesh fondalees. 
However, this way out of the problem is not acceptable. Not only does 
it involve giving up principle (E), which is the central principle of 
standard propositional-function semantic theories, but also it is mani-
festly mistaken on its face. For (9) and (10) are plainly false: a person 
could consciously and explicitly think that Jane Fonda rajneeshes with-
out consciously and explicitly thinking that the result of applying the 
propositional function (.A.y)(Fxr) to Jane Fonda is true. Indeed, some-
one could think the former proposition and not even have the concept 
of applying a function to an argument! So this way of trying to solve the 
problem must be abandoned. 
The second way in which propositional-function theorists might try 
to regain the missing distinctions is by holding that these distinctions 
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are pragmatic not semantic. That is, they could hold that strictly and 
literally: 
The proposition that Jane Fonda rajneeshes = the proposi-
tion that Rajneesh fondalees . 
is true. But in conversation when you say: 
I think that Jane Fonda rajneeshes. 
what you would mean differs from what you would mean when you say: 
I think that Rajneesh fondalees. 
This pragmatic difference can then be explained by means of Gricean 
rules of conversation without calling into question the above strict and 
literal identity. So goes the pragmatic solution. 
However, this kind of pragmatic solution creates a special problem 
for propositional-function theorists. In Section 5, I will show that such 
pragmatic solutions require an independent solution to the paradox of 
analysis. Specifically, such pragmatic solutions require positing a dis-
tinction between analyzed intensions and unanalyzed intensions. That 
is, there must be two types of intension, analyzed and unanalyzed. 
Given this, propositional-function theorists who advocate the pragmatic 
solution are faced with two grave problems. First, they are forced to 
decide which type of 0-ary intension - analyzed or unanalyzed - are 
to be the values of propositional functions. Inevitably, the choice will be 
utterly arbitrary. Second, they must work out a theory of the other type 
of 0-ary intension (i.e., the type of 0-ary intension not chosen to be 
values of propositional functions). Presumably, some further logical 
machinery besides that provided by the propositional-function theory 
will be needed for this purpose, and the use of this further logical 
machinery will lead propositional-function theorists to a disunified 
general theory of PRPs. On an algebraic approach to PRPs, both of 
these defects - the arbitrariness and the disunity - are avoided. 
(4) I have just indicated that the existence of two types of PRP -
analyzed and unanalyzed - creates grave problems for propositional-
function theorists who would try to save their theory by pragmatic 
maneuvers. I now want to show that these grave problems are quite 
general: they arise as long as there is more than one type of PRP. 
Suppose for a moment that I am wrong about the need to introduce a 
distinction between analyzed and unanalyzed intensions to solve the 
208 G . BEALER 
paradox of analysis. No matter; there are also compelling intuitive and 
theoretical reasons for positing a distinction between fine-grained and 
coarse-grained PRPs.20 This distinction is enough to produce the same 
sorts of special problems for the propositional-function thesis noted in 
the previous paragraph. I will spell this out more fully. 
Certainly both fine-grained and coarse-grained intensions exist. Con-
sider an example. Intuitively, the thought that the glass is half empty is 
different from the necessarily equivalent thought that the glass is half 
full. (Thoughts are fine-grained 0-ary intensions.) Not so for the condi-
tions (situations, states of affairs) to which thoughts correspond in the 
world. (Conditions are coarse-grained 0-ary intensions.) Intuitively, the 
glass's being half empty is the same condition (situation, state of affairs) 
in the world as the glass's being half full. It is just the physical condition 
that you are observing right there in front of you. 16 
Now the existence of more than one type of 0-ary intension gives 
rise to the following question. If properties are treated as propositional 
functions, are the values of these functions thoughts, or are they condi-
tions (situations, states of affairs)? Are the values of these functions to 
be identified with fine-grained or coarse-grained 0-ary intensions? Two 
observations. 
First, the answer seems utterly arbitrary. If properties are identified 
with propositional functions, what grounds are there for thinking that 
their values are coarse-grained rather than fine-grained or fine-grained 
rather than coarse-grained? No answer seems available. The proposi-
tional-function thesis requires the assumption of an arbitrary dogma 
on this point. 
Suppose, however, that this inevitable arbitrariness is swallowed (as 
it should not be) and that the values of propositional functions are 
arbitrarily identified with one of the two types of 0-ary intensions. How 
is one to develop a theory of the other type of intension? This job will 
require some new kind of logical machinery, machinery not used in the 
original propositional-function approach. My second observation is this . 
This new logical machinery is likely to be very much like that used in 
the algebraic approach to intensional entities, which is the main com-
petitor to the propositional-function approach. If so, what is gained by 
not using an algebraic approach to both types of intension from the 
start? Furthermore, whatever the new kind logical machinery is like, it 
certainly must go beyond that needed by the original propositional-
function approach. For this reason, the resulting propositional-function 
theory inevitably fails to provide a unified treatment of both types of 
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intension. One type of intension will be treated one way (i.e., by means 
of the original propositional-function machinery); the other type will be 
treated some other way (i.e., by means of the additional kind of logical 
machinery). (Perhaps you will try to identify coarse-grained intensions 
with equivalence classes of necessarily equivalent fine-grained inten-
sions. But how unintuitive and unnatural!) The algebraic approach, by 
contrast, provides a unified treatment of all types of intension; there 
is no ad hoc disanalogy in the way different types of intension are 
treated.21 
Now let me summarize our conclusions about propositional func-
tions. In addition to the various philosophical problems cited at the 
outset of this section, there seem to be four significant logical problems 
confronting theories that identify properties and unary propositional 
functions. By similar arguments, we can also show that there are four 
analogous problems confronting theories that identify n-ary relations 
and n-ary propositional functions (n ~ 2). In view of these conclu-
sions, we should not be tempted by the short term technical simplifica-
tions imparted by these theories. Properties cannot be reduced to unary 
functions (or other such entities made prominent by mathematics). 
Likewise, n-ary relations cannot be reduced to n-ary propositional 
functions . Properties and relations must be taken at face value as primi-
tive, logically fundamental entities. By saying this, I am not suggesting 
that propositional functions do not exist. (Indeed, on the most economi-
cal theory of propositional functions, a unary propositional function is 
just a univocal 22 binary relation-in-intension; a binary propositional 
function is just a univocal ternary relation-in-intension, and so forth.) 
The point is this. Once properties and relations are taken as irreducible 
entities, propositional functions will cease to play the pivotal role that 
they played in earlier formulations of intensional logic motivated by 
mathematics. A correct formulation of intensional logic treats prop-
erties and relations directly, and propositional functions are treated, not 
as something special, but as just one more kind of relation. 
5. A TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT FOR FINE-GRAINEDNESS 
The are conversational contexts in which utterances of the following 
three sentences would be true, true, and false, respectively: 
(1) Chewing = masticating. 
(2) Nobody doubts that whatever chews chews. 
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(3) Nobody doubts that whatever masticates chews. 
However, in most fine-grained intensional logics (e.g., my system T2), if 
sentences (1) and (2) are true, (3) must be true also. Hence, prima facie 
substitutivity paradox. 
There are two reasonable responses to this problem. The first is to 
accept the intensional logic as literally sound and to give a pragmatic 
explanation of our intuitions about the divergence in truth value of 
utterances of (2) ~nd (3). On this pragmatic explanation, sentences 
(2) and (3) would be deemed semantically equivalent. Nevertheless, 
utterances of (2) and (3) in an appropriate conversational context could 
express non-equivalent propositions. To determine exactly which pro-
positions would be expressed conversationally, we must appeal, not just 
to the semantics of the language, but also to Gricean pragmatic rules of 
conversation. 23 
The second response to the problem would be to construct a new 
theory that admits ultra-fine-grained intensional distinctions so that 
'[(Vx)(Cx -+ Cx)] # [(Vx)(Mx -+ Cx)]' is literally true. The idea (once 
suggested by Putnam) 24 is to exploit the differences in grammatical 
form between the two complex abstracts flanking '# '. Specifically, the 
predicate 'C' (for 'chew') is repeated in the first abstract but not in the 
second; so the first has the form '[(Vx)(lx -+ lx)]' whereas the second 
has the form '[(Vx)(lx -+ 2x)]'. The new theory, then, is built around 
the following general principle: two abstracts are codenoting only if 
they have exactly the same grammatical form. It turns out that such a 
theory is relatively easy to formulate within the general algebraic 
approach I have advocated.25 
How are we to choose between these two responses to the puzzle -
the pragmatic response and the ultra-fine-grained response? The latter 
response is initially very appealing because it is systematic. But there is 
reason to doubt it. True, this response solves the above puzzle (and 
many similar puzzles including the original version of the famous puzzle 
given by Benson Mates).26 But, ironically, there are simpler versions of 
the above puzzle that cannot be solved no matter how fine-grained we 
allow PRPs to be. For example, consider any two predicates that 
express the same property, for example, 'chew' and 'masticate'. (Or 
choose some predicate 'C' and then just stipulate that a new predicate 
'M' expresses the same property as that expressed by ' C'.) There are 
conversational contexts in which someone "halfway" along in the pro-
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cess of mastering the predicate 'masticate' could make a true assertion 
by uttering, "I am sure that whatever masticates chews, but I am not 
sure that whatever chews masticates." In this example, the relevant two 
intensional abstracts have the same grammatical form: '[(V x) ( Mx -+ 
Cx)]' and '[(V x) ( Cx -+ Mx)]' are grammatically isomorphic. Both of 
these abstracts have the same grammatical form: [(Vx)(lx -+ 2x)]. 
Thus, the second response will not allow •us to hold that these two 
abstracts denote distinct propositions, and, therefore, it cannot be used 
to solve the puzzle. Consequently, there is no choice but to invoke the 
first response, that is, to solve this puzzle pragmatically. (See below for 
details.) However, if we must resort to a pragmatic solution of this 
simple version of the substitutivity puzzle, uniformity demands that we 
use it to solve all the more complex versions, too. Moreover, if the 
pragmatic solution is adequate, the second response, which involves 
positing ultra-fine-grained intensional distinctions, would appear to be 
superfluous ontologically. 
This conclusion raises a general methodological issue. How are we to 
decide which types of fine-grained distinctions to admit in intensional 
logic? Principles of ontological economy would seem to suggest that we 
should admit those and only those distinctions that are needed to 
explain substitutivity failures. But we have just seen that a pragmatic 
solution to at least some substitutivity puzzles is inevitable and that, 
once this style of explanation is available, ultra-fine-grained intensional 
distinctions are probably not be needed to explain the versions of the 
substitutivity puzzles for which they were designed. If so, considerations 
of uniformity and ontological economy would lead us to reject such 
distinctions. Supposing that this is right, one wonders how far this sort 
of elimination can go. What types of fine-grained intensional distinc-
tions, if any, survive a systematic attempt to explain substitutivity 
failures pragmatically? 
A transcendental argument yields a partial answer to this question: 
the fine-grained distinctions that survive must include at least those that 
are needed to spell out satisfactory pragmatic explanations. It turns 
out that very fine-grained intensional distinctions are needed for this 
purpose. Here is the argument. 
Consider the person "half-way" along in the process of mastering the 
predicate 'masticate'. He asserts, "I am sure that whatever masticates 
chews, but I am not sure that whatever chews masticates." In an actual 
conversational context the person certainly could assert something true 
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by saying this. The problem is to identify what it is. The ultra-fine-
grained theory, developed in response to the original puzzle above, 
identifies the proposition that whatever masticates chews and the pro-
position that whatever chews masticates. The reason is that the two 
abstracts 'that whatever masticates chews' and 'that whatever chews 
masticates' have exactly the same grammatical form: [(V x) (1 x ..... 2x)J. 
So this theory implies that the sentence uttered by the person in our 
present example strictly and literally expresses something that is false. 
(Indeed, the utterance would express something formally contradictory, 
namely, that the person is sure of [(Vx)(lx --+ 2x)] and not sure of 
[(V x) (1 x --+ 2x)].) Since on the ultra-fine-grained theory the uttered 
sentence expresses something that is strictly and literally false and since 
our person has asserted something that is true, what he has asserted 
must be something other than what the sentence strictly and literally 
expresses. Therefore, the problem of identifying what truth he has 
asserted cannot be solved semantically; it must be solved pragmatically. 
In pragmatics, we may take into account, not only the syntactic and 
semantic features, but also features of the conversational context and 
Gricean rules of conversation. Given all this information, one is led to 
identify the person's true assertion with something like the following: 
I am sure that whatever satisfies the predicate 'masticate' 
also chews, but I am not sure that whatever chews also 
satisfies the predicate 'masticate'. 
This pragmatic solution is a good first try, but there is a problem with 
it.27 (Indeed, there are several philosophers - Tyler Burge, for example 
- who think this is a fatal problem requiring us to revolutionize our 
thinking about PRPs and propositional attitudes.) The problem is as 
follows. 
Suppose that the person who utters the above sentence - 'I am sure 
that whatever masticates chews, but I am not sure that whatever chews 
masticates' - is a child (or a slow-learning adult) who appears to 
have no command of metalinguistic concepts we take for granted. In 
particular, suppose that this child appears to have no articulated con-
cepts from linguistic theory such as the syntactic concept of a linguistic 
predicate or the semantical concept of satisfaction(-in-English), and 
suppose that the child appears to be unfamiliar with any device (e.g., 
quotation) for naming expressions. Furthermore, when we try to teach 
the child these bits of linguistic theory, he has great difficulty learning 
them. (He learns to use the new predicate 'masticate' far more readily.) 
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However, a few years later when we try again to teach him these things, 
he learns them quickly. This shows, so the worry goes, that the above 
pragmatic analysis of his assertion represents him as having reached a 
stage of conceptual development well beyond anything we can plausibly 
attribute to him (i.e., a stage at which he has command of the indicated 
concepts from linguistic theory). If so, the pragmatic analysis is mis-
taken; the child's assertion could not have involved the metalinguistic 
concepts attributed to him by this analysis. 
There appears to be only one general way out of this problem, and 
that is to treat our child's apparent ignorance of metalinguistic concepts 
as a species of the special kind of ignorance involved in of the paradox 
of analysis. Consider two analogies. First, suppose a child can sort 
variously shaped objects so well that it becomes plain that he recog-
nizes, say, the circular objects as circular and, therefore, that he has 
command of the concept of circle. However, suppose that the child 
displays no particular behavior to indicate that he has command of 
the concept of a (mathematical or physical) point, the concept of a 
locus of points, the concept of a (mathematical or physical) plane, 
etc. When we try to teach him geometric theory - with its definition 
of circle as a locus of points in the same plane equidistant from a 
common point - we get nowhere. (If he were a few years older, he 
would be able to learn this readily.) In this situation it is natural to 
characterize the child as follows, he has an unanalyzed concept of 
circle, that is, an unanalyzed concept being-a-locus-of-points-in-the-
same-plane-equidistant-from-a-common-point. However, he lacks the 
theoretical concepts (point, locus, plane, etc.) needed to unpack this 
unanalyzed concept. Accordingly, he lacks the analyzed concept of 
circle, that is, the analyzed concept of being a locus of points in the 
same plane equidistant from a common point. 
For a second analogy, consider someone who can reliably tell whether 
a middle-sized object comes to a halt smoothly. But this person seems 
to have no grasp of the sophisticated concepts of calculus required to 
say what it is for an object to come to a halt smoothly; indeed, if the 
person has limited mathematical aptitude he might never be able to 
grasp the relevant parts of calculus. It would be natural to say of this 
person that he has an unanalyzed concept of coming-to-a-halt-smoothly 
but that he lacks the specific theoretical concepts needed to unpack this 
unanalyzed concept and, accordingly, that he lacks the analyzed con-
cept of coming to a halt smoothly. 
With these geometry and calculus examples in mind, let us return to 
~ 
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the linguistics example. Suppose that a child is not yet in command of 
various theoretical concepts from linguistics, concepts such as satisfac-
tion-in-English, linguistic predicate, and spelling (or quotation). Despite 
this, it should still be possible for the child to have an unanalyzed con-
cept whose analysis involves such theoretical concepts from linguistics. 
This would be quite analogous to the child's having an unanalyzed 
concept of circle (i.e., an unanalyzed concept of being-a-locus-of-points-
in-the-same-plane-equidistant-from-a-common-point) and yet not being 
in command of the•theoretical concepts from geometry (point, locus, 
plane, etc.) needed to unpack this concept. And it would also be 
analogous to the child's having an unanalyzed concept of coming-to-a-
halt-smoothly and yet lacking the theoretical concepts from calculus 
needed to unpack this concept. Since this sort of thing is commonplace 
in geometry and calculus examples, surely nothing can prevent it from 
happening in linguistics examples, too. It would just be dogmatic to rule 
out this kind of phenomenon. 28 
Let us apply these conclusions to our example. Our child who was 
"half-way" along in the process of learning to use the predicate 'masti-
cate' has an unanalyzed concept of satisfying-the-predicate-'masticate', 
but he is not in command of the theoretical concepts (satisfaction, 
predicate, quotation) needed to unpack this unanalyzed concept. If this 
is right, then we have the makings of a solution to the problem con-
fronting the pragmatic analysis of what true proposition the child 
asserted when he uttered, "I am sure that whatever masticates chews, 
but I am not sure that whatever chews masticates." The child's assertion 
comes to something like this: 
I am sure that whatever satisfies-the-predicate-'masticate' 
also chews, but I am not sure that whatever chews also 
satisfies-the-predicate-'masticate'. 
Since this analysis attributes to the child an unanalyzed concept of 
satisfying-the-predicate-'masticate', it avoids the problem of mistakenly 
attributing to the child theoretical concepts that he will acquire only at 
a more advanced developmental stage. And this is what we needed to 
avoid the criticism. 
Notice, however, that this way of salvaging the pragmatic solution of 
the original 'chew' /'masticate' substitutivity puzzle is based on a very 
fine-grained intensional distinction, namely, the distinction between 
an unanalyzed concept of satisfying-the-predicate-'masticate' and the 
analyzed theoretical concept of satisfying the predicate 'masticate'.29 
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Now, as far as I can tell, this outcome is unavoidable. There appears 
to be no way of salvaging the pragmatic solutions to substitutivity 
puzzles that does not somehow invoke antecedently given intensional 
distinctions that are very fine-grained. Here, then, is a place where 
very fine-grained intensional distinctions cannot, even in principle, be 
eliminated by the technique of pragmatic explanation: they are needed 
to make the pragmatic explanations satisfactory. If this is right, a very 
fine-grained intensional logic is inevitable. 
6. SELF-CONSTITUENCY, MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE , AND 
THE PARADOX OF ANALYSIS 
If fine-grained PRPs are inescapable, what about type-freedom? In the 
next section I will argue that all types of type freedom are inescapable 
except for one, namely, self-constituency. The purpose of the present 
section is to suggest that the leading argument for fine-grained self-
constituency is unsound. Specifically, I will suggest that this argument 
turns on a certain confusion over the paradox of analysis. (We have just 
seen that the paradox of analysis is a problem that needs to be solved if 
any intensional logic is to be able to handle certain very elementary 
substitutivity problems.) 
The argument for fine-grained self-constituency I have in mind alleges 
that self-constituency is required to account for the phenomenon of 
mutual knowledge. This argument proceeds as follows. Without self-
constituency, two people with mutual knowledge would have to have 
infinitely complex thoughts or infinitely many thoughts (perhaps one for 
each finite number of embeddings plus perhaps one for each limit 
ordinal to "sum up" all the preceding finite levels). So if there were no 
self-constituency, a person who thinks that he or she has mutual knowl-
edge with another must have incredibly complex thought(s) . But such 
thought(s) far exceeds an ordinary person's conceptual development. 
By contrast, a thought involving self-constituency is very simple to 
articulate: you and I both know this, where one accompanies the utter-
ance of 'this' with an appropriate gesture suggesting "self-reference." 
Thus, the self-constituency theory is the only satisfactory theory of 
mutual knowledge. Or so the argument goes. 
This argument, however, seems to be question-begging, for it dis-
regards the phenomenon of the paradox of analysis. As we saw in the 
previous section, the fact that someone does not know calculus hardly 
shows that calculus is not involved in the analysis (definition) of the 
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person's unanalyzed concept of coming-to-a-halt-smoothly. By the 
same token, suppose that a person does not know the theory of inten-
sional logic, and suppose that the person has no articulate command 
of propositions with a large number of self-embeddings (i.e., proposi-
tions denoted by intensional abstracts that contain several - perhaps 
infinitely many - iterated occurrences of 'think' or 'know'). This does 
nothing to show that the person does not think unanalyzed propositions 
whose analysis (definition) involves a large number of self-embeddings . 
Likewise, the fact that the person does not know the theory of inten-
sional logic and has no articulate command of propositions with a large 
number of self-embeddings does nothing to show that self-embedding is 
not sufficient to analyze (define) the person's unanalyzed concept of 
mutual knowledge. We have already seen that the fine-grained distinc-
tion between unanalyzed and analyzed concepts is needed to solve 
certain elementary substitutivity puzzles. And it is not at all implausible 
that this machinery is sufficient for dealing with the phenomenon of 
mutual knowledge. That is, given the apparatus of unanalyzed concepts, 
perhaps we can characterize ordinary mutual knowledge as a kind of 
unanalyzed multiple (perhaps infinite) self-embedding. When we un-
pack unanalyzed mutual-knowledge propositions, the resulting analyzed 
propositions will typically be unfamiliar to the people having the mutual 
knowledge. But all this shows is that ordinary people are not in com-
mand of these analyzed propositions. It does not show that they are 
not in command of the unanalyzed propositions. Hence, the kind of 
ignorance upon which the mutual-knowledge arguments for self-con-
stituency rest might be nothing more than the kind of ignorance 
involved in commonplace occurrences of the paradox of analysis . If so, 
the above argument fails to win its conclusion. It would amount to an 
elementary confusion regarding the paradox of analysis. 
In fact, this ignorance argument for self-constituency might cause 
trouble for the self-constituency theory itself. Suppose that the self-
constituency theory is right; that is, suppose that there is some mutual 
knowledge proposition (call it this) such that: this = [I think this] . In this 
case, the following identities would hold: [I think this] = [I think [I think 
this]] = [I think [I think [I think thislll = [I think [I think [I think [I think 
thislll] = ... and so on ad infinitum. But is it plausible that, when I was 
a child with mutual knowledge, I could think: 
[I think [I think [I think [I think [I think [I think [I think 
[I think [I think [I think this]]]]]]]]]]. 
It hardly seems so. Something seems to have gone wrong. 
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I think that the most plausible way for self-constituency theorists 
to deal with this problem is to invoke the machinery of unanalyzed 
concepts. Specifically, self-constituency theorists would hold that this, 
the proposition we have been discussing, is an unanalyzed proposition. 
When this unanalyzed proposition is partially analyzed, its constituents 
are: me, thinking, and the unanalyzed- proposition this. If so, it would 
follow that this, which is an unanalyzed proposition, cannot be identical 
to the proposition that would ordinarily be expressed by 'I think this' , 
for the latter proposition would ordinarily be a partially analyzed 
proposition. (If I were to assert 'I think this', I would ordinarily have an 
articulated awareness of the constituents: me, thinking, and this.) How-
ever, if self-constituency theorists must take this line, they will have no 
real life examples of analyzed propositions that are constituents of 
themselves. At best, they will have examples of unanalyzed proposi-
tions that are constituents of themselves. But if their best examples are 
always unanalyzed propositions, it is a theoretical question of how best 
to analyze these propositions. Self-constituency theorists will have run 
out of direct evidence supporting their preferred analysis. Accordingly, 
the issue must be settled on grounds of theoretical virtue. However, it 
is plausible that the most economical theory is that which denies self-
constituency and instead treats all the problematic examples as unana-
lyzed propositions whose complete analysis would involve infinitely 
many self-embeddings but no self-constituency. This theory is more 
economical than the self-constituency theory, for on the latter theory 
the problematic examples must also be treated as unanalyzed pro-
positions whose complete analysis would involve infinitely many self-
embeddings. So it is not clear that there is any theoretical advantage 
that justifies positing fine-grained self-constituency. 30 
7 . A TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT FOR FINE-GRAINED 
TYPE-FREEDOM 
Suppose our goal is to do semantics for natural language. Then the 
most elegant theory of meaning for predicates, open-sentences, and 
sentences is provided by a fine-grained type-free theory of PRPs. But 
many people (Quine, Davidson, etc.) are skeptical about the need for a 
theory of meaning in a satisfactory comprehensive theory of the world; 
at most, a semantical theory need only provide a theory of truth and 
reference. We reply that PRPs are appropriate even in a theory of truth 
and reference, for in natural language 'that'-clauses and infinitive and 
., 
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gerundive phrases call for a theory of truth and reference in which 
these intensional abstracts refer to PRPs. 
Suppose that this kind of PRP semantics provides the most straight-
forward theory of truth and reference for natural languages containing 
intensional abstracts. Does it follow that PRPs really exist? Not at all, 
say our extensionalist critics, for there is a certain kind of possibility we 
must rule out before we can be sure that PRPs really exist. This pos-
sibility goes as follows. It is in principle possible that in the evolution of 
natural languages crazy sorts of syntactic constructions could emerge. 
Suppose the most straightforward way to give truth conditions for 
atomic sentences containing such syntactic constructions is to treat the 
syntactic constructions as if they refer to some special category of 
items. That does not show that there really are such items. For, strictly 
and literally, these atomic sentences might all be degenerately false; or, 
worse, they all might be neither true nor false. Given the possibility that 
some special syntactic constructions in natural language are defective in 
this way, how are we to decide which ones are and which ones are not? 
We intensionalists should have an argument that intensional abstracts -
and the associated ontology of PRPs - are not defective in this way. 
To see the problem more clearly, consider the following rather 
fanciful example. (The purpose of the example is to bring out a philo-
sophical point; it need not be likely but only metaphysically possible.) 
In the sentence 'Someone walks slowly in the plaza' we might associate 
with the adverb 'slowly' a rate, namely, the rate slow. Similarly, we 
might associate with the verb 'walks' an kind of action, namely, walking. 
And we might associate with 'walks slowly' a more specific kind of 
action, namely, slow walking. We might associate with 'in the plaza' a 
place, namely, in the plaza. Indeed, although it would be Jess natural, 
we might even associate with 'walks in the plaza' another specific kind 
of action, namely, walking in the plaza. But is there really anything 
semantically associated with the string 'slowly in the plaza', a new 
ontological category that we might call rate-places? It hardly seems so. 
More likely, anyone who accepts rate-places on this dubious basis has 
just been mislead by syntax into inventing a new metaphysical category 
that has as yet been given no justification.31 Or if rate-places are not 
ontologically offensive enough for you, consider an alleged meta-
physical category of items semantically associated with the string 'slowly 
in'. (We might call these dubious items rate-relations.) But if no more 
justification is offered, it would be wrong to posit rate-relations. As 
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far as we can tell, rate-places and rate-relations are not real; they are 
metaphysical fictions having no real being. Now suppose that for some 
reason (or, even worse, for no reason besides finding it cute) people 
begin to "nominalize" phrases like 'slowly in the plaza': 'to be slowly in 
the plaza', 'being slowly in the plaza', or what not. And people utter 
such things as 'I like being slowly in the plaza more than being quickly 
at the ski resort'. Although this l'.Ourse of events would be unlikely, 
surely it would be (metaphysically) possible. (If you doubt this, do you 
have aq argument that it is metaphysically impossible?) Suppose then 
that this possibility were realized. In that case it would be a task for 
philosophers of language and linguists to figure out the semantics for 
sentences containing these new noun phrases. 
Suppose that after much work these theoreticians announce to the 
scientific and philosophical world that they have actually discovered a 
new metaphysical category, plates, which are a bit like places and a bit 
like rates but not reducible to them. Reductionistically inclined people 
respond by trying to reduce plates to something else, for example, to 
functions or to sets; anti-reductionists reply in their usual ways. But 
something has gone seriously wrong here. There are really no such 
things as plates. If we are seeking a comprehensive theory of the world, 
we should just leave them out. (Notice the pronoun 'them': how insidi-
ous apparent reference to these nonentities can be!) At least this is what 
plate eliminativists would say. And no one can deny feeling the strong 
intuitive pull of this response. 
The question confronting us proponents of intensional logic and 
PRPs is this. Do our favorite syntactic constructions - 'that'-clauses 
and gerundive and infinitive phrases - and our inferred metaphysical 
categories of fine-grained type-free PRPs have a genesis similar to that 
of plates? We do not think so, but what reason do we intensionalists 
have for thinking this? If we cannot show that PRPs and intensional 
abstraction have a fundamentally different status from that of plates and 
plate-talk, principles of economy would seem to oblige us to give up 
the whole business. In this way, we intensionalists must do more than 
rely on surface features of natural language; we must face head-on the 
spectre of Quinean extensionalism and of Carnapian ontological con-
ventionalism. 
Surely PRPs and intensional abstraction (in contrast to plates and 
plate-abstracts) do have a privileged and fundamental status, but how 
are we to show this? I submit that for an answer we ultimately must 
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turn to the theory of knowledge. The idea is to give a transcendental 
argument. The argument consists of two stages. The first is to specify 
the conditions that, according Quinean extensionalists or Carnapian 
conventionalists, must be met by any acceptable comprehensive theory 
of the world; the second is to show that these conditions cannot be met 
unless the theory invokes PRPs. (Here I am adapting a style of argu-
ment developed by George Myro.33 In what follows I will concentrate 
on Quinean extensionalism; minor changes would be needed to meet 
the challenge of Ca'rnapian conventionalism, but the argument would 
have substantially the same form.) To justify their own scientific and 
philosophical theories and to criticize those of their opponents, exten-
sionalists must inevitably invoke a principle of epistemic appraisal or 
acceptability. The following, which is extrapolated from the writings of 
Quine, captures what is at the heart of these principles: 
(1) A theory is acceptable if and only if it is (or belongs to) the 
simplest overall theory that explains the data.34 
(2) When taken together, the natural sciences (plus perhaps 
extensionaf mathematics) comprise the simplest overall 
theory that explains the data. 
It follows from these two principles that a theory is acceptable if and 
only if it is (or belongs to) the overall theory that consists of the natural 
sciences (plus perhaps extensional mathematics). Intensional logic and 
the theory of PRPs does not belong to natural science (or extensional 
mathematics); therefore, these theories are not acceptable. So argues 
the extensionalist. 
Notice, however, that the expressions 'acceptable', 'simplest', 'explain', 
and 'data' do not belong to the primitive vocabulary of this overall 
theory (natural science plus extensional mathematics). Let us suppose 
that these expressions are not definable in that primitive vocabulary. In 
this case, the extensionalists' two basic principles - and all the power-
ful conclusions that depend on them - would not belong to their 
overall theory and, therefore, would not be acceptable according to 
extensionalism. This self-defeating consequence can be avoided only if 
the key expressions 'acceptable', 'simplicity', 'explanation', and 'data' 
are, contrary to our supposition, definable within the overall theory. 
For this reason, the extensionalist is committed to the thesis that these 
expressions are indeed so definable. But this thesis entails that the 
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overall extensionalist theory must possess an apparatus for representing 
definitional relationships. Now this apparatus either would or would 
not be metalinguistic. If it were not metalinguistic, it would have to be 
(something like) one of the following: 
By definition, for all x, Fx iff ... x ... . 
It is definitionally true that, for all x, Fx iff ... x ... . 
The concept of being an x such that Fx = the concept of 
being an x such that . . . x . . . . 
F-ness =the property of being an x such that ... x .... 
(Universal material biconditionals would not suffice, for they do not 
have the force of definitions. On the contrary, a universal material 
biconditional 'For all x, Fx iff ... x .. .' is just an ordinary theoretical 
sentence about Fs.) But constructions of this type clearly have a fine-
grained intensional logic, and the simplest general explanation of such 
constructions is in terms of fine-grained intensional entities. So on this 
option, extensionalists would be forced to invoke a logical construction 
and an associated ontology that, by their very own principles, is 
unacceptable. On the other hand, if the apparatus for representing 
definitional relationships were metalinguistic, it would have to involve a 
strong semantical term like 'synonymous in L', 'definitionally equivalent 
in L', 'analytic in L', or some kindred term. But once again strict 
extensionalism would be thwarted. For generalized Quinean indeter-
minacy considerations show that strong semantical terms like 'synony-
mous in L' cannot be defined using only terms belonging to the natural 
sciences and extensional mathematics. On this metalinguistic option, 
extensionalists would again be committed to a definitional apparatus 
that, according to the central principles of their philosophy, is un-
acceptable. This is not to say that strong semantical notions like 
synonymy cannot be defined. They can be, but only in terms of inten-
tional notions - along Gricean lines, for example. But considerations 
rather analogous to those leading to Quine's indeterminacy thesis show 
that these intentional notions cannot be defined using only terms 
belonging to the natural sciences and extensional mathematics.35 At the 
core of these considerations is the fact that the logic for intentional 
matters is fine-grained intensional logic. However, the simplest explana-
tion for fine-grained intensionality in logic is in terms of fine-grained 
intensional entities. So, just as in the case of a non-metalinguistic 
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apparatus, a metalinguistic apparatus for representing definitional rela-
tionships produces an ontological commitment to fine-grained inten-
sional entities. 
Our conclusions so far are the following. Extensionalists are forced 
by their own basic principles to avail themselves of some apparatus for 
representing definitional relationships. But any such apparatus - meta-
linguistic or non-metalinguistic - turns out to be unacceptable accord-
ing to these very same principles. Thus, extensionalism in its strict form 
is a self-defeating philosophy and, hence, is unacceptable. Further, since 
any apparatus adequate for representing definitional relationships pre-
supposes a logical theory that is ontologically committed to fine-grained 
intensional entities, extensionalists have no choice but to revise their 
basic principles (1) and (2) in order to make room for this inevitable 
intensional ontology.36 
This line of argument shows that a logical theory having a fine-
grained intensional ontology is unavoidable in any acceptable compre-
hensive theory, but in the same vein can we show that this logical 
theory must be type-free? I think we can. We have seen that principles 
(1) and (2) must be revised in order to avoid self-defeating conse-
quences. Suppose that we have done so. I submit that, by examining the 
resulting principles, we can show that anyone making an acceptable 
claim to have an acceptable overall theory is committed to each type of 
type-freedom (except self-constituency). 
To illustrate; let us consider self-embedding. Anyone making an 
acceptable claim to have an acceptable overall theory needs a theory 
(or definition) of acceptability that, by its very own standards, is accept-
able. That is, the person needs a theory of acceptability: 
(1 ') A theory is acceptable iff .... 
such that the proposition that (1 ') is acceptable is a thesis of the overall 
theory. But the latter proposition involves self-embedding: 
It is acceptable that a theory is acceptable iff ... 
In symbols, 
A[(\tx)(Ax ...... x ... )]. 
In this way, self-embedding seems to be an inevitable feature of an 
overall theory that, by its own standards, is acceptable.37 We thus have 
a transcendental argument, not just for fine-grained PRPs, but for self-
embeddable fine-grained PRPs. 
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Similar considerations show that the other favored forms of type-
freedom - transcendental predicates, universal universal quantification, 
impredicativity, and self-instantiation - are also inevitable. The upshot 
is that fine-grained type-free intensionality has a special objective status. 
Although many syntactic constructions in natural language might, for all 
we know, commit us to unfounded metaphysical categories. The com-
mitment to fine-grained type-free intensional entities is different. This 
commitment is transcendentally justified, for to avoid self-defeat we 
have no choice but to incorporate these basic entities into any accept-
able comprehensive theory of the world. 
NOTES 
1 There has also been terminological confusion in use of the terms 'extensional' and 
'intensional'. For example, some people talk of "nonextensional sets." But this is an 
unjustified deviation from traditional usage. An item is an extensional entity if it 
satisfies the extensionality principles associated with the item's ontological category. 
In the case of sets, the key extensionality principle is that for all sets y: ('<tz)(z E x -
z E y) - x = y. Traditionally, sets by nature satisfy this principle; if an item does not 
satisfy this principle, set theorists would deem it a nonset. Calling it a "nonextensional 
set" would count as a simple category mistake in the eyes of traditional set theorists. 
Some people have deemed a predicate "intensional" if it is satisfied by the Godel 
number of one sentence but not the Godel numbers of another sentence that is 
equivalent to this sentence in truth value. But this too deviates from traditional usage, 
both logico-linguistic and ontological. It does not even match the nonstandard Russell-
Whitehead usage according to which a propositional function is deemed "intensional" if 
it is satisfied by a proposition and yet is not satisfied by another proposition that is 
equivalent to this proposition in truth value. 
2 Some transcendental predicates (e.g., 'is self-identical') apply not just across meta-
physical categories but to everything one can talk about (in the language of the theory); 
such predicates express properties that are instances of themselves. But not all tran-
scendental predicates are like this. For example, 'is contemplated by Saint Francis' is 
transcendental, for the inquisitive saint did, we may be sure, contemplate at least one 
item from each metaphysical category. However, this predicate does not apply to every-
thing; for, being limited, the saint did not contemplate everything. Nor is it the case that 
the property expressed by this predicate is an instance of itself, for the humble saint 
never contemplated the property of being contemplated by Saint Francis. (Consider 
also transcendental predicates like 'is a possible object of thought that is not an instance 
of itself'.) Moreover, not every predicate that expresses a property that is an instance of 
itself is transcendental. For example, 'is a property' does not apply to relations or 
propositions, but it does express a property that is an instance of itself. 
Incidentally, suppose that some PRP theory contains a transcendental predicate 
(e.g., 'x = x') that expresses a self-instantiated property. It does not follow that in the 
theory this predicate is self-embeddable in the sense I am about to introduce in the text. 
For even though the sentence 'Ix = x], has [x = xj; might be true and/ or provable in 
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the theory, more complex intensional abstracts involving self-embedding (e.g., the 
intensional abstract '![x = x], has [x = x],]') might not be well-formed terms in the 
theory. · 
J Nino Cocchiarella, review of Quality and Concept. I. G. McFetridge, review of 
Quality and Concept. 
4 I prove this and a series of kindred results in "The Significance of Completeness 
Results in Intensional Logic." 
5 Cocchiarella (ibid.) claims that incompleteness can be proven when the first closure 
condition is imposed. He begins with the premise that an arbitrary first-order necessity 
sentence 'N[A(F1, ••• , Fn)I' - where 'F1 ', ••• , 'Fn ' are the predicates occurring 
in A - is true in a model if and only if the second-order sentence '(V F 1 ••• Fn)A' is 
true in the model. Then he claims that this implicit second-order element in first-order 
intensional logic is enough to prove incompleteness. But his premise is based on an 
elementary error. To see why, choose any model in which interpretation I assigns the 
property of being self-identical to the primitive predicate 'F'. That is, l('F') = [x = x],. 
On this interpretation, the intensional abstract '[(3x)Fxj' would denote [(3x)x = x], i.e., 
the necessary proposition that something is self-identical. So on this interpretation 
the first-order intensional sentence 'N[(3x)Fx]' is true. However, according to 
Cocchiarella's premise, this sentence is true on an interpretation if and only if the 
second-order sentence '.(V F)(3x)Fx' is true on the interpretation. But this second-order 
sentence false; indeed, it is logically false . So Cocchiarella's premise does not hold, and 
his alleged incompleteness proof fails. 
The source of Cocchiarella's error is something like this. In PRP semantics, proposi-
tions are the primary bearers of necessity; the mere fact that a syntactically simple 
sentence like '(3x)Fx' is not true by virtue of its syntactic form tells us nothing about 
whether the proposition expressed by the sentence (i.e., the proposition that (3x)Fx) is 
necessary and, in turn, whether the sentence 'N[(3x)Fx]' is true or false in a given 
model. Cocchiarella's error seem to arise from a kind of generalized use/mention 
confusion, that the syntactic form of a linguistic expression of a proposition and the 
modal status of the proposition should match up. But this only happens in very special 
cases; it does not typically happen. 
Incidentally, incompleteness of first-order intensional logic would follow if we had 
the following premise (which is adapted from an argument that Cocchiarella gives about 
first-order modal logic): for any first-order extensional sentence 'A', the first-order 
intensional sentence 'N[A]' is true in a model if and only if 'A' is a logically valid first-
order extensional sentence, i.e., a theorem of first-order extensional logic. Given this 
premise, if first-order intensional logic were complete, then for every such sentence 'A', 
the intensional sentence' •N[A]' should be valid (and, hence, a theorem) if and only if 
'A ' is not a logically valid first-order extensional sentence. But the latter sentences are 
not recursively enumerable, so the former are not either. Therefore, not every such 
sentence ' •N[A ]' can be a theorem. Consequently, first-order intensional logic is 
incomplete. However, the premise is based on an elementary error. To see this, let 'A ' 
be the invalid first-order extensional sentence '(3x)Fx', and consider any model like 
that discussed a moment ago, wherein interpretation I assigns to 'F' the property of 
being self-identical, i.e., [x = x],. In such a model the intensional abstract '[(3x)Fx]' 
denotes [(3x)x = x], i.e., the necessarily true proposition that something is self-identical. 
Therefore, in this model the first-order intensional sentence 'N[(3x)Fx]' would be true. 
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However, according to the premise, this sentence should be false because the first-order 
extensional sentence '(3x)Fx' is not a logically valid sentence. So the premise does not 
hold, and thus the alleged incompleteness proof fails. Like the earlier erroneous 
premise, this erroneous premise seems to be based on a kind of generalized use/ 
mention confusion, that the syntactic form of a linguistic expression of a proposition 
and the modal status of the proposition should always match up. And of course this is 
not so. 
6 This style of semantics is advocated on pp. 209-210, Quality and Concept. 
7 See "The Thesis of Extensionality," section 37, Quality and Concept, for an extended 
discussion of this important methodological issue. 
8 See, e.g., Bealer (1979, 1982), pp. 55-57; Zalta (1980); Mi:innich (1983). 
9 See Aczel (1980); Mi:innich (1983); Chierchia and Turner (1988), Aczel (1987 ), 
Turner (1987). Some of the following reasons I will give against the propositional-
function thesis were reasons that originally guided me toward the algebraic approach in 
Bealer (1979 and 1982). However, some of these reasons have occurred to me after-
ward. 
10 A propositional-function theorist might reply that this argument is an instance of the 
"fallacy of incomplete analysis." However, this reply is theoretically weak, for it forces 
the propositional-function theorist to hold that our intuitions here cannot be taken at 
face value. But other things being equal, a theory is superior if is can take relevant 
intuitions at face value. Our theory that properties are not propositional functions 
permits us to do just this. 
11 Fine-grained intensions are not needed just for treating the propositional attitudes. 
They are also needed for treating various purely logical matters such as logical truth 
and analyticity for propositions. This point is discussed in section 1 of G. Bealer, "The 
Logical Status of Mind." 
12 See Bealer (1979) and chapter 2 (1982). 
IJ See Church (1954). 
14 See Church (1951, 1974). See also Anderson (1980). 
15 This principle is Russellian in flavor. Fregeans would wish to modify it slightly. 
However, when the appropriate Fregean principles are substituted, we still can make 
much the same argument against the propositional-function thesis. 
16 C. Anthony Anderson (1986) has independently given a somewhat similar argument 
in connection with a comparison of Russellian and Fregean higher-order intensional 
logics. 
17 More colloquially, being someone who rajneeshes = being someone who follows 
rajneesh, and being someone who fondalees = being someone whom Jane Fonda 
follows. Or to rajneesh = to be someone who follows Rajneesh, and to fondalee = to be 
someone whom Jane Fonda follows . In the symbolism in Quality and Concept, [Rx], = 
[Fxr], and [Fy]y = [FjyJr 
18 This argument is given in a broadly Russellian setting in which the relevant functions 
may be applied to individuals, for example, to Jane Fonda and Rajneesh. But much the 
same argument can be given in a Fregean setting in which the relevant propositional 
functions are instead applied to individual concepts, for example, to the individual 
concept of (being) Jane Fonda and the individual concept of (being) Rajneesh. 
Some might wonder whether, in the Russellian setting, the problem might not turn 
on the use of names in intensional contexts. This is not so, for the entire argument can 
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be given using externally quantifiable free variables instead of names. Where u = Jane 
Fonda and v = Rajneesh, 
Therefore, 
So: 
[Rx], = [Fxv] ,. 
(Ax)( Rx)= [Rx],. 
(Ax)(Fxv) = [Fxv], . 
(Ax)(Rx) = (Ax)(Fxv). 
(Ax)(Rx)(u) = (Ax)(Fxu)(u). 
Hence, by (C) and (E), 




[Fy]y = [Fuy]y · 
(AY)(Fy)"" [FY]r 
(AY)(Fuy) = [FuyJr 
().y)(Fy) = (AY)(Fuy). 
(Ay)(Fy)(v) = (Ay)(Fuy)(v). 
Hence, by (C) and (E), 
[Fv] = [Fuv]. 
Combining these two results, we get: 
[Ru]= [FvJ . 
That is , 
The proposition that u rajneeshes =the proposition that v fondalees. 
However, it seems possible that someone could be consciously and explicitly thinking 
that u rajneeshes while not consciously and explicitly thinking that v fondalees . 
19 If we wish a PRP theory that makes even finer-grained intensional distinctions (for 
example, so that [RJJ ~ [FjrJ), we should adopt the apparatus introduced in Chapter 3 
of Quality and Concept for resolving the paradox of analysis. 
Incidentally, some people have suggested that the fondalee/ rajneeshee example is a 
counterexample to the principle of /3-conversion from A-calculus. If this were right, so 
much the worse for A-calculus. However, /3-conversion does not seem to be what the 
example calls into question. How could it? On the standard interpretation of ).-calculus 
'f (x)' denotes the value that results when function f is applied to argument x, where f is 
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assigned to 'f' and xis assigned to 'x '; and '(Ax) (f(x)) (x)' denotes the value that results 
where a certain function is applied to argument x, where that function is one that yields 
f(x) as its value when it is applied to argument x. Accordingly, given an assignment to 
'f' and 'x', 'f(x)' and '(Ax) (f(x)) (x)' cannot fail to denote the same thing. And this 
generalizes. Therefore, /3-conversion seems unassailable. So the counterexample does 
not call into question /3-conversion; rather, it calls into question the identification of 
properties with propositional functions. There is nothing wrong with ).-calculus. The 
point is that A-calculus cannot be applied as a theory of properties, for properties and 
propositional functions behave differently. 
211 We need not take a stand here on the relationship between unanalyzed intensions 
and coarse-grained intensions, even though it would be intriguing to explore the 
prospect of identifying them. For the purposes of the present argument, it is enough 
that there should be intuitive and /or theoretical grounds (independent of the paradox 
of analysis) for positing the existence of coarse-grained intensions. Such grounds are 
spelled out more in fuller detail in Chapters 8-10 of Quality and Concept (especially 
Section 40). See also David Lewis, "New Work for a Theory of Universals," and section 
1 of G. Bealer, "The Logical Status of Mind." 
21 A further problem confronts propositional-function theories that make use of a 
fundamental logical operation of abstraction to represent how various "complex" 
properties are "formed." On this approach, one first "forms" 0-ary intensions by simply 
applying given propositional functions to arguments. Then, to "form" various "complex" 
properties, one applies the abstraction operation to these 0-ary intensions indexed to 
some argument. For example, let p = the fine-grained proposition that this closed plane 
figure has 3 sides. Then abst(p, 3) = the property of being an x such that this closed 
plane figure has x sides. For another example, let us define a cegree to be a unit of 60 
degrees. (So just as trilaterals have 180 degrees, they have 3 cegrees; just as quadri-
laterals have 360 degrees, they have 6 cegrees, etc.) Let q = the fine-grained proposi-
tion that this closed plane figure has 3 cegrees. Then abst( q, 3) = the property of being 
an x such that this closed plane figure has x cegrees. Since p and q are fine-grained , 
abst(p, 3) ~ abst(q, 3). This is the right outcome. 
This "abstraction approach," however, cannot be used to treat coarse-grained inten-
sions. To see what the problem is, let p' and q' be the conditions in the world to which 
p and q correspond, that is, the condition that this closed plane figure has 3 sides and 
the condition that this closed plane figure has 3 cegrees. Since p' and q' are necessarily 
equivalent, p' = q'. Therefore, no matter how abst is characterized for coarse-grained 
in tensions, abst(p', 3) = abst( q', 3). But, then, which of the following properties should 
be identified with abst(p', 3): the property of being an x such this closed plane figure 
has x sides, or the property of being an x such that this closed plane figure has x 
cegrees? (Note that these properties are not necessarily equivalent.) The choice is 
arbitrary. Furthermore, what happens to the property that is not chosen to be 
abst(p', 3); how does it get "formed" on this approach? Evidently, there is no answer. 
22 A binary relation r is uni vocal iff for all x, y, z, if x, y stand in relation r and x, z 
stand in relation r, then y = z. 
23 This general approach to substitutivity failures is discussed in detail in section 39 
"Pragmatics," Quality and Concept; a concrete example of the conversational prag-
matics is traced out on pp. 172-174. A similar approach has recently been proposed 
by Nathan Salmon in Frege's Puzzle. 
24 Hilary Putnam, "Synonymity and the Analysis of Belief Sentences." 
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25 In the semantics, for example, we define a new type of model structure in which 
there is a primitive logical operation for each different syntactic form . These operations 
will be 1-1; their ranges will be disjoint, and their behavior with respect to the 
extension functions H in K will be just what one would expect. 
26 Benson Mates, "Synonymity." 
27 Tyler Burge expresses a closely related worry; see pp. 127ff., 'Belief and Synonymy'; 
p. 97, 'Individualism and the Mental', and 'On Knowledge and Convention'. The issue 
here dramatizes the fact that any adequate theory of language learning must incorporate 
a resolution of the paradox of analysis. 
28 But this is what Tylar Burge seems to be saying ibid. 
29 A formal semantics that deals with fine-grained distinctions like this may be 
developed along the lines suggested in Quality and Concept, p. 257 , n. 17. 
The only other known way of trying to solve this sort of substitutivity puzzle is by 
treating the standard propositional attitudes as three-place relations holding among a 
person, a proposition, and a "mode of presentation." However, there are a host of prob-
lems with this proposal. For example, it runs into trouble with iterated propositional 
attitudes, quantifying-in, and general sentences that mix intentional and nonintention al 
predicates. We plan to spell out these difficulties in a future publication. 
-'" In his theory of intentional causation, John Searle maintains that self-constituency is 
involved in perception reports and intentional action reports . (See chapter 4 "Inten-
tional Causation ," Intentionality.) But Searle's arguments ride on the same confusions 
over the paradox of analysis made by the self-constituency theorist described in the 
text. 
31 Of course, there might be some kind of function indirectly associated with 'slowly in 
the plaza'. However, unlike rate-places, functions do not comprise a new metaphysical 
category; they are just a kind of relation, namely, univocal relations. But "rate-place" 
realists are not advocating functions; they are advocating a new metaphysical category 
above and beyond functions. 
32 Another sort of example might help. When taking notes, I often engage in certain 
sloppy practices - "private language," if you will. For example, instead of using 
intensional abstracts ('that'-clauses and gerundive and infinitive phrases), I often use 
expressions that on the surface appear to be quotation names; sometimes I even use 
external quantifiers to "bind" variables occurring within these "quasi-quotation-names." 
Although my impression is that this sloppiness occurs randomly, there might for all I 
know be some pattern to it. This might lead an observer to conclude that these quasi-
quotation-names actually purport to refer to items that are neither PRPs nor linguistic 
expressions but rather are items in special new metaphysical category. Now suppose 
that my note-taking practices were to become fashionable: everyday people begin to 
write in this way all the time, and they develop what seem to be linguistic intuitions 
about how properly to use these quasi-quotation-names. These expressions appear to 
he neither genuine intensional abstracts nor genuine quotation names. We would then 
have a case of a syntactic construction that on the surface appears to generate an 
ontological commitment to a previously unknown metaphysical category. Would you be 
justified in concluding on the basis of this linguistic data that there really are items 
belonging to this previously unknown metaphysical category? Surely not. The question 
to us intensionalists is this: what reason do we have for thinking that intensional 
abstracts and PRPs have a fundamentally different status? 
33 George Myro, "Aspects of Acceptability." The present adaptation of George Myra's 
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argument is given more fully in of my paper "The Logical Status of Mind." In the latter 
paper, a number of other supporting arguments are also given; see especially Sections 1 
and 5. 
34 In place of this principle, an extensionalist might adopt a coherentist principle. 
The outcome would be the same, however. For more on coherentism, see Section 7 
"Coherentism" in my paper "The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism." 
35 For a full argument, see G. Bealer, "Mind and Anti-Mind: Why Thinking has no 
Functional Definition." 
36 There is a somewhat different transcendental argument for the same conclusion. In 
this argument, we focus not on definitions but rather on the notion of data. Specifically, 
we argue that the only satisfactory general theory of what counts as data relies on fine-
grained intensionality. Given this conclusion and given the extensionalists' commitment 
to principle (1 ), they have no choice but to admit fine-grained intensionality. So once 
again, extensionalism turns out to be a self-defeating philosophy. This argument is 
spelled out in Section 5 of "The Logical Status of Mind ." 
37 Such a theory must include a type-free solution to the Montague-Kaplan paradox. In 
"Propositions and Representations" Nicholas Asher and Hans Kamp have made much 
progress on this difficult problem. Although their solution is not entirely perfect, it does 
provide strong evidence that our transcendental demand for a theory that, by its very 
own standards, is acceptable is a demand that can be met. 
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JOHAN VAN BENTHEM 
SEMANTIC TYPE-CHANGE AND 
SYNTACTIC RECOGNITION 
1. FLEXIBLE CA TEGORIAL GRAMMAR 
The standard categorial grammar of Ajdukiewicz and Bar-Hillel was 
based on fixed categories, which could be combined by a rule of 
functional application. Recently, more flexible versions have been pro-
posed, incorporating rules of category or type change in the process of 
evaluating expressions. A prominent example is the 'Geach Rule': 
changetype (a,b) to ((c,a),(c,b)); 
which can be used, e.g., to lift sentence negation (type (t, t)) to pre-
dicate negation (type (( e, t), ( e, t))). Another well-known case is the 
'Montague Rule': 
change type a to ( (a, b ), b ): 
which can lift proper names (type e) to noun phrases (type (( e, t), t)). 
But also, Partee and Rooth 1983 have a rule of 'argument lowering', 
whose general pattern is this: 
change type (((a, b), b), c) to (a, c). 
This changes, e.g., complex intransitive verbs (type (( e, t), t) , t) to 
simple predicates (type ( e, t)) . 
The general linguistic motivation for type-shifting is manifold (wit-
ness the various contributions in Oehrle, Bach and Wheeler (1988) or 
Buszkowski, Marciszewski and Van Benthem (1988)). For instance, the 
Geach Rule allows constituent structures in which a function combines 
with not just its 'completed' arguments, but also with 'parametrized' 
versions thereof. Such structures have been used to represent discon-
tinuous long-distance dependencies in syntax: a phenomenon which was 
formerly believed to be an insuperable obstacle to categorial descrip-
tion. (Similar applications have been found in compositional morphol-
ogy.) Another kind of motivation has been a desire to simplify the 
baroque category/ type system of Montague Grammar. With a regime of 
type-shifting rules, initial types for expressions can be kept simple, 
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